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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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           FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
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                      (Asheville Division)
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   SHIRLEY TETER,
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               Plaintiff,
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                              :Civil Action: 1:17-CV-256
   VS
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   PROJECT VERITAS ACTION
   FUND, ET AL,
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                Defendants.
             ----x
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                              Friday, May 3, 2019
                              Asheville, North Carolina
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          The above-entitled action came on for a Final
   Pretrial Conference Hearing Proceeding before the
12
   HONORABLE MARTIN K. REIDINGER, United States District
   Judge, in Courtroom 3, commencing at 8:56 a.m.
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## PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. We have one matter that is on the calendar for today and that is

Teter versus Project Veritas which is on for a final pretrial conference, as this case is on for the trial calendar for the May term.

I recognize most of the attorneys but not quite all. We have some new characters here today, so I'll allow all the counsel who are participating to announce their presence on the record.

MR. SASSER: Good morning, Your Honor, Jonathan Sasser from Raleigh, with the firm of Ellis and Winters, representing Ms. Teter.

MS. RINI: Preetha Rini, also with Ellis and Winters, representing Ms. Teter.

MS. WELLS: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Dixie Wells from Ellis and Winters, as well, representing Ms. Teter.

MR. STREZA: Good morning, Judge. I'm Ralph
Streza. I represent Ms. Teter also. I'm with the firm
Critchfield, Critchfield and Johnston, and I'm here from
Ohio.

MR. DEAN: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Jamie
Dean and I represent the defendants.

MR. MONTECALVO: Good morning, Your Honor. Mike

1 | Montecalvo; I also represent the defendants.

THE COURT: As far as -- can you all hear me?

Because I'm hearing this echo that is just terrible. Can
you still hear me?

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: Okay. Maybe that's going to be a little bit better. If there had been a window, I would have jumped out the window before the end of this if I had to put up with that.

The entire objective of this proceeding today is to sort of plan out how we're going to try this case. I want to try to streamline the things that need to be done of an administrative nature because, once we are trying the case, it is my objective to have the jury in the jury box literally eight hours a day until we're done.

So, for the first part of this, I want to go through a number of the things that I need for all of you to know about how I expect this case to go so that we can plan accordingly and so that you can plan accordingly. Then we'll move on to some other issues to where we have, hopefully, a common understanding of how this case is going to go forward so that we can all account for that case in the manner it will be tried.

Let me start with the simple question to which I never get the simple answer. And that is, how likely is

1 it that this case is going to try? Mr. Sasser, I'll 2 start with you.

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MR. SASSER: Your Honor, based on our discussions this week, it seems very, very likely.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dean, Mr. Montecalvo, do you have any different thoughts?

MR. DEAN: No, sir. I think it's a certainty.

THE COURT: Okay. The next question that I have is, how long do you think it's going to take to try the case? Before you answer that, let me give you a few parameters to keep in mind. Because here, unlike in superior court where they have other things going on on the same days, we start every morning at 9 o'clock and we go to 6:00 p.m. There's a one hour break for lunch. I literally intend to have the jury in the jury box eight hours a day until we're done.

Anything that needs to be done outside of the presence of the jury, it would be my preference and my intention of doing that either before 9 o'clock in the morning, during the lunch break, or after 6:00 p.m. That comes with the admonition that I give all lawyers who come to try cases here, and that is: Bring your crackers. Because I will assure the jury that they will get the opportunity for lunch; I make no promises like that for you.

Jurors already feel like you're wasting their time. And if they feel like you're dragging it out by letting them sit in the jury room for a couple hours and that you do some stuff out of the presence of the jury, and back and forth like that, they get really ticked off. They don't get ticked off at me, they get ticked off at the lawyers. So that's the schedule that I really don't intend to deviate from if at all possible.

Another aspect of this that I want you to keep in mind is you're in the first place on the trial calendar. There's another civil case but they're behind you. That means that when we start trying this case on Monday, the 20th, that Friday is the Friday of Memorial Day weekend. I don't need to explain to you what impact that's going to have on the jurors.

All of that having been said, what I'd like from both sides is an estimate of how long is it going to take to try the case, and how many witnesses do you expect you are going to call? And, of that number of witnesses, how many will be live? How many will be by deposition?

Mr. Sasser, I'll start with you.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I think we're going to have two live witnesses and five or six videotaped witnesses.

THE COURT: How long do you think the trial will

1 take? SASSER: I was going to say two days. MR. not sure when we will -- the gun will be fired on Monday, 3 4 after jury selection. I think we will be -- certainly be done by the end of the day Wednesday. 5 THE COURT: With your case? 6 7 SASSER: Yes, sir, with my case. MR. 8 THE COURT: Do you have an estimate of how long 9 the trial is going to take? 10 SASSER: I don't know for their side of the MR. case how long they're going to take. But I still think, 11 as we said at summary judgment hearing, four to five days 12 13 for everything. 14 THE COURT: So you have two live witnesses but five on video? 15 16 SASSER: As many as five, Your Honor. MR. 17 or six. 18 THE COURT: Well since you have them, so to speak, 19 "in the can," you should have a real good idea of how 20 long that part of the presentation is going to take. I would if I knew the rulings on 21 SASSER: 22 certain motions in limine and designations of depositions, and that way I could certainly compact them. 23 24 But some of that's still up in the air. We're not going 25 to be able to cut them until --

I understand that. But are the THE COURT: potential cuts so great that you don't have an estimate of, you know, a two=hour deposition with the cuts comes to one hour and 50 minutes or comes to ten minutes? I'm sorry, Your Honor, I do not have MR. SASSER: that estimate at this point. I do not intend on putting any one witness on the video for more than two hours, and probably less than that. THE COURT: I can't say that I've ever had a trial where five out of seven witnesses were by deposition. don't think jurors like that very much. That's a kind of risky way of proceeding, but your case is what your case is. I understand, Your Honor. MR. SASSER: THE COURT: Okay. Very good. They're from out of state. MR. SASSER: THE COURT: Mr. Dean, what are your thoughts? MR. DEAN: Your Honor, the same as the plaintiff in that some of the number of witnesses depends on the Court's rulings today. We could have as many as seven, I think, live witnesses. Many of them will be very short. I think some of them will be less than maybe even an hour. We will have two witnesses by deposition, and each of those depositions is less than an hour and a half. think that the original estimate that -- even including

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jury selection is that we can be completed, given the Court's parameters, by close of business on Thursday with the presentation, is what we're shooting for, and I believe that can happen.

THE COURT: So, roughly, with the idea of getting the case to the jury maybe on Friday morning?

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

MR. DEAN: Yes, Your Honor.

on a trial calendar with one other case. We'll pick both juries on the morning of the 20th, on that Monday morning. Since the other case is second we will pick their jury first. Once that jury is picked then I'll release that jury to the following week, I'll release the parties in that other case until the following week, and then we'll pick your jury and go straight from your jury selection in to the presentation of the evidence.

We'll get to the method of jury selection in a few minutes. I would certainly propose to have both juries selected before we take the lunch break on Monday.

The next broad topic that I want to address is the manner of presentation. The first topic there concerns the presentation of exhibits to the jury. Well presentation of exhibits in general, including presentation to the jury. Upstairs, I'm sure you noticed

at the summary judgment hearing that we have an electronic system for presenting exhibits. Back in the old days, when I was trying lawsuits, and you had the paper copy, and you asked to approach the witness, and you walked up to the witness stand and hand it to the witness. You don't do that anymore. That burns an awful lot of time.

There is a system for displaying an exhibit to the Court and witness. Then if something is admitted and is to be published to the jury there's a means by which it can be published to the jury. There are very few situations in which anybody needs to be approaching the witness. This isn't a criminal gun case. You don't have to take the gun up to the officer or anything like that. Use of the electronic equipment is mandatory -- it's not optional -- because it saves us an awful lot of time.

If you need any sort of tutorial on the use of that equipment, please talk to the clerk about arranging a time to get that tutorial, whether it is today or one day next week. It will need to be either today or next week, because the following week there will probably be no one here from the clerk's office to assist you with that; and then the following Monday is when we start the trial.

Please make sure that all electronic equipment

that you are planning to use to connect to the system is compatible with the system. I have had it happen before that the attorney comes for his tutorial, he hooks up a laptop, and all of the exhibits transfer just fine. He shows up for trial with a different laptop, he connects it, and then when we pushes "play" for the video nothing happens. We're not stopping for that. It's your responsibility to make sure it's all compatible; to make sure it all works. So please keep that in mind.

The next topic that I want to address with you pertains to opening statements and closing arguments. I believe that all of you are probably experienced enough to know that jurors completely discount everything you say. They want to hear the story from the witnesses. For that reason, I generally limit, in civil cases, each side to an opening statement of ten minutes. Closing arguments for a case as long as what we're talking about here? Maybe 30 minutes to a side.

Do any of you feel that those parameters are not realistic in light of the specifics of this lawsuit.

MR. SASSER: No, Your Honor.

MR. DEAN: No, sir, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If something does come up to where we need to revisit that, regarding closing arguments, we can do that at the charge conference. But I want you all to

understand at the front end that those are generally my expectations.

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The next thing that I wanted to address regarding the presentation of the case is the issue of stipulations. I noticed you-all filed some very extensive stipulations, but what you filed left me uncertain as to how you were planning to present this. Because it seemed like an awful lot of what you have in the stipulations is what you're going to be presenting through your witnesses or, at least, what I would have been expecting you would be presenting through your witnesses.

So is this just a list of the things that are not in dispute, or is this actually a set of stipulations that the parties are intending for either the Court or one of the attorneys to read to the jury during the course of the trial?

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, it's my usual experience that the judge would read those in. I realize some are specific and they will be covered, and I don't want to duplicate anything. So I think that it may depend on a particular stipulation as to whether we would want the Court to start out reading them in or reading them in at the start of the defense case some of them.

THE COURT: Okay. The very last thing you said

puzzles me. Because if it's at the start of the defense case that means the plaintiff has rested; you're past the Rule 50 motions. So are you telling me these stipulations have nothing to do with any element of your case?

MR. SASSER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SASSER: Just that they may come in at the appropriate time. Definitely, we want them in before the directed verdict motion.

THE COURT: Okay. With regard to stipulations though. First of all, the general rule is that for the presentation of stipulations whatever you-all agree to as to how to present them is fine with me. If you -- if plaintiff's counsel is going to read them, and you agree to that, that's fine. If defense counsel is going to read them, and you agree to that, that's fine.

The default is that if you don't agree as to how this stipulations will be presented then I will read the stipulations when plaintiff's counsel tells me that other than the stipulations the plaintiff has no further evidence. In other words, the very last thing before the plaintiff rests is they will be read by me unless you stipulate or agree to something else.

Because of what you were just saying a moment ago,

Mr. Sasser, about these stipulations and not wanting to duplicate things. As we go through the plaintiff's case, if you are wanting to winnow down that list of stipulations to where at the end of plaintiff's case you only want me to read stipulations 30 through 38. So long as you let me know, I'm glad to do that. But, other than that, I don't have any way of knowing. I'm not going to go through and check off, well, witness one got items three, four and five in. And I can't keep up with that and everything else.

MR. SASSER: We will keep up with that, Your 12 Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

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The next issue regards exhibits, stipulations regarding authenticity of exhibits, and exhibit lists, and exhibit notebooks. So it pertains to stipulations; it also pertains to exhibits in general. There's a particular format for exhibit lists that's in The Case Management Order. Please follow that. And in there, there is a -- one of the columns is with regard to whether there are stipulations or agreements about either authenticity, admissibility, et cetera.

The way I do it with exhibits -- because I think it's a waste of time to read to the jury for each exhibit. There is a stipulation as to authenticity.

There's a stipulation as to admissibility. The way it will work is, even if you have stipulated, when Mr. Sasser has examined the witness about Exhibit 10, it has been authenticated, and it's -- or there's a stipulation as to the authenticity, and Mr. Sasser says the plaintiff will offer Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, I will still ask if there is any objection. If there is no objection, it will be admitted. It just becomes a nice little routine for getting in the exhibits. It becomes very efficient for doing it that way, notwithstanding having the stipulation, but any stipulation will not be read.

With regard to exhibits that are presented during video deposition testimony. How do you propose to do that? If you have the witness on the screens for the jury, how do you propose to display the exhibits to the witness -- to the jury?

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I think we'll be able to do that through a split screen. If not, we will figure something out. The one concern I have is that something may be Exhibit 14 at the trial; it was the same document was Exhibit 3 in Mr. O'Keefe's deposition; Exhibit 2 in somebody else's deposition. So we're going to have to figure out a way to make sure that the jury knows we're talking about the exhibit that's before them and that

that's exactly who the witness is talking about.

THE COURT: Yeah. That presents some real logistical problems. I urge you to try to figure out a way to work that out ahead of time. I have no idea whether you have the expectation that these videos were going to be used at trial. Obviously, if you know ahead of time, the easy way to do that is you have sequential. Numbers. In other words, Exhibits 1 through 5 are the first deposition; 6 through 25 are the second deposition, and so on. But that's water over the dam.

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Some things about exhibit notebooks and exhibit lists that I want to -- it's not really an admonition. There are some things I don't want you to do. And I say that based on what I've had other attorneys do, and it's a pain in the neck. First of all, when you're about to try a case, you have a pretty good idea of what exhibits you're going to use and what exhibits you're not going to use. So if there are these 20 exhibits that you're pretty certain that you're going to use, and that's pretty much your case, please do not give me an exhibit list that has 150 exhibits listed on it. By the same token, if you expect that there are going to be a hundred exhibits that you're going to use, please don't give me an exhibit list that has 20 of them listed.

If you need to add two or three exhibits during the course of the trial -- I mean, we've all had that experience that there was some document that you found in discovery that you really didn't think was going to be all that important, and on the second day of trial it suddenly becomes very important. You can add it to the list. That's not a problem. When you start doing that over and over and over again, it's a problem.

Please don't do what I had one lawyer do in a trial that we had about three years ago. He showed up for trial, I kid you not, with 23 bankers' boxes of the exhibits. He had an exhibit list that went for -- I forget what it was -- 400 exhibits. During the course of the trial, of those 400 exhibits he used about 40; and he added another 60 to the list during the course of the trial. By the end of that trial I had no idea what was in evidence and what wasn't. My document management was out the window. That becomes impossible to manage. So please do not do anything like that.

Also, do not have a catch-all exhibit. I've had a lawyer do this before. He had those 60 exhibits that he thought that he was going to put into evidence, and then Exhibit 61 was, I think, quite literally everything else that had been produced in discovery. It was a notebook all by itself. And in the middle of trial he says I

would like to offer into evidence Exhibit Number 61, page 122, or whatever it was, and he wanted to examine the witness about. By the time you take a 400- or 500-page exhibit, load it into the system, scroll down to page 122, and get it on the screen, the jury's asleep, and you've probably overloaded the system. I mean it will take forever. So that just doesn't work. I'd rather you keep that entire stack in your briefcase. And when you need page 122 you pull it out, you put an exhibit sticker on it making it new Plaintiff's Exhibit 61, and then you go forward from there.

Are there any questions about what I'm talking about regarding the presentation of exhibits.

MR. STREZA: Judge, may I ask a question?
THE COURT: Please.

MR. STREZA: In several of the depositions the witnesses have been shown short video clips and have been asked to comment on the content of the video clips. How would the Court allow us to present those video clips, especially when we're showing the video depositions of those witnesses.

THE COURT: Well I don't see how that's really any different from any other exhibit that you're planning to display to the jury. Whatever means you are intending to use to display an exhibit to the jury in the middle of a

video deposition is what I would suggest that you use for that. And I've seen it done two different ways. One is what Mr. Sasser mentioned earlier, a split screen. And the other one that I've seen is that the exhibit supplants the visage of the deponent for that five seconds, or whatever it is, on the screen, and the video is edited in that manner. Either of those would be acceptable.

MR. STREZA: Thank you.

THE COURT: Any other questions about the presentation of exhibits? Again, this is all for making it an efficient presentation to the jury.

One thing I want to note with regard to the exhibit notebooks. Again, I should have looked before we started today whether you got the old version of the Case Management Order or the new version. The old version says you have to bring four copies of the exhibit notebooks. If that's what you got, I'm amending that right now. You only need to bring two. One copy of all the exhibits that are on your exhibit list you need to present to the Court before we get started. That's my copy so that in the event that I need to be referring to an exhibit that you're not displaying on the electronic system that I have a copy of it there at the bench.

The second copy, the second notebook, is what I

refer to as your insurance policy. Because if everything 1 else breaks down there are document cameras, one on each counsel table. We have never run into the problem of 3 4 those not working. So that if you cannot present the exhibits any other way you can take that hard copy out of 5 your insurance policy notebook, you can put it on the 7 tray with the dot cam, and then you can show it to the witness, you can show it to the Court, and if it's admitted you can show it to the jury. So that's all you 10 need. You don't need the additional copies. That's presuming, of course, that you've exchanged copies of the 11 12 exhibits which you're supposed to have done anyway. I'm 13 not counting the exchanged copies. That's your 14 responsibility to get done. So any questions about that 15 issue? Mr. Sasser. 16 Yes, sir. More as to depositions MR. SASSER: 17 If I have a five-minute video to show of than exhibits. 18 one particular witness and their cross-examination would be 45 minutes, how do we work that out? Do they need to 19 20 play theirs in their case, or do they play theirs with 21 mine? How does that --22 THE COURT: Maybe I don't understand your question. 23 The rule of completeness is that if you're

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testimony then everything regarding that deposition comes

presenting a portion of a deposition in lieu of live

in at that time. Using your example. If you have a video deposition where you want to put in five minutes but they want to put in an hour. If you are wanting to put in that five minutes as part of your presentation, then the hour -- I mean the five minutes plus the hour come in at that time, and it comes in in the order that it was done at the deposition.

MR. SASSER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else with regard to exhibits, exhibit notebooks, exhibit lists, or any of that? Okay.

The next issue that I want to turn to is jury selection. I can't remember whether this is in your supplemental case management order or whether we emailed it to you, or maybe neither. I want to make sure that we are of a common understanding as to how jury selection will proceed. We use the "mandatory strike" method, which I know that the Administrative Office of the federal courts in Washington would like all federal courts to use but I understand that not all do. If you're in federal court often you're probably familiar with this system.

In short, when we call in the jury pool for this case, we will then have 14 people who are selected at random who we'll put in the jury box. Of those 14, I will conduct a voir dire. After I conduct a voir dire

then plaintiff's counsel will have an opportunity to voir dire the 14 for approximately 20 minutes. That's not 20 minutes per juror; that's 20 minutes for the panel.

After that, defense counsel will have the opportunity to voir dire the 14 for approximately 20 minutes.

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At the end of that period you will have the opportunity to make challenges for cause at the bench. Any jurors who are excluded for cause, or stricken for cause, will be replaced by new people from the jury pool and we'll repeat this process but only as to the new members of the jury pool -- of the jury panel.

So, for instance, if we call up 14 at the end of that process and there are two that are stricken for cause we'll call two new jurors into those two seats. I will then voir dire the two new jurors, the plaintiff's counsel will have an opportunity to voir dire those two new jurors for approximately two minutes each -- so probably four minutes -- defense counsel will get approximately four minutes, and then you'll get an opportunity to challenge for cause those two. You don't get to go back to the other 12. I realize that's very different from what you do in superior court but it's much more efficient as well.

Once we have 14 people in the box who have not been stricken for cause then both sides have to exercise

all of their peremptory challenges. I will say, for instance: Mr. Sasser, what says the plaintiff as to the exercise of her first peremptory challenge? You would say, the plaintiff thanks and excuses Juror 2, Ms. Smith. I'd say, Mr. Dean, what says the defendants as to the exercise of their first peremptory challenge? He will say, we excuse Juror 14, Mr. Jones.

Each side has three peremptories; you have to use all three. Please don't do what I've had other attorneys do after they've used one and they stand up and say plaintiff is satisfied with the jury. No. It's called "mandatory strike" because you have to use all three peremptory strikes. Simple math. You start with 14, plaintiff strikes three, defendant strikes three; you end up with eight. The eight are your jury.

We don't have alternates because with a civil case they can have a verdict all the way down to six. So if we lose one juror in the middle of trial we will continue with a jury of seven. If we lose two jurors in the middle of trial we will continue with a jury of six. And I've had it happen one time. If you lose three jurors in the middle of trial we can only continue with a jury of five by the stipulation of the parties. I never thought that would ever happen but it happened once so I mention it.

1 Any questions about the jury selection method that we're going to use for selecting the jury in this case? Your Honor, could I ask a related 3 MR. DEAN: 4 question about the jury? THE COURT: 5 Yes. 6 MR. What, if any, information will we be DEAN: 7 allowed to glean about the jurors before we arrive to court on May 20th? 8 9 THE COURT: Well that's a good question. As of 10 right now, I don't have an answer for you. Here's the 11 We have a fairly large number of jurors who have been summoned for this term. In fact, I believe we had 12 13 something like 500 maybe, or maybe even 600 jury 14 summonses that went out. Some subset of that -- in fact, 15 a relatively small subset of that will be randomly 16 selected on, what is it, Friday, the 17th to come in on 17 Monday, the 20th? So I think that there may be some 18 information available next week about the 500 but not 19 about the ones who will actually be in the jury pool that 20 morning. I don't know if that helps you any. 21 DEAN: As to the subset that's randomly 22 selected. Is that something that we can learn on the 23 17th, or is that only information we can learn on the 20th? 2.4 25 I think the answer is that it would be THE COURT:

available on the 17th, but I'm not directly involved in 1 that whole process. And when I say "available on the 17th, " I don't mean at 9 o'clock in the morning. 3 I mean 4 quite late in the day. One of the reasons that I hesitate is I happen to know that there's not going to be 5 anybody in the clerk's office on Friday, the 17th, 6 7 because that's the day of -- during that week is our district meeting. So I don't want to make you any 8

I guess the best answer is inquire further and hopefully I'll know more. The person to contact would be my career law clerk, Ms. Ritter, and she can -- she'll have information for you to update that.

MR. DEAN: Thank you, sir.

promises that I can't keep.

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THE COURT: Anything else with regard to jury selection? The next thing -- I mean that covers, kind of, the issues having to do with how the trial will be conducted and all of those logistical problems.

From here I wanted to turn more to the things that are specific to this case. So if there are any issues that you want to talk about regarding trial logistics now would be the time.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, what courtroom will we be in if Your Honor knows at this point.

THE COURT: Oh. Well there's really only one

courtroom in this building with a usable jury box and that's the one where we were for the summary judgment hearing.

MR. SASSER: Thank you, Your Honor.

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And there's an issue about a witness who has a conflict. I think there was a motion pending on the -- a consent motion pending on that.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, that was something specific to this -- to the trial so -- but we'll get there. That's here on my list.

One thing that I didn't mention, and in light of what you said earlier it's probably irrelevant. But in the event that you somehow settle this case there are a few rules that we have because of the system that we use concerning bringing in jurors and how expensive juries If you settle the case, settle the case by noon on the 17th, the Friday before the trial, you have to not only inform the court that you have settled the case but you also have to file with the court -- and you can file it under seal. But you have to file what I refer to as a "term sheet." It is a sufficient description of the terms of your settlement such that, if necessary, the Court can enter a judgment based on that settlement agreement. It has to be signed by the attorneys. of you seem certain that you will not settle the case,

but I've heard that before in cases that settled, so I mention that for what it's worth.

Now does that mean that you are prohibited from settling the case after noon on the Friday before?

Obviously, the answer is no. It's just that you will get tagged with the jury costs. Bringing in a jury pool like that, and the additional portion of the jury pool for a case like this, you're probably looking at something like, I don't know, \$4,500, \$5,000. Juries are not cheap. And they're less cheap around here because we have jurors coming from so far and we have to pay their mileage, and for a lot of them we have to pay their lodging.

Okay. Anything else that we need to address before we move on to things that are directly related to this action?

The next thing that I want to turn to is what the verdict sheet is going to look like. I was a little bit puzzled by what had been submitted with all of these essentially factual interrogatories. As you're probably aware, the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions with regard to defamation do not propose submitting a defamation claim on anything like that. In fact, if we follow the pattern jury instructions approach the verdict sheet would really consist of three issues.

The first one, essentially, is did the defendants defame the plaintiff? And I'll come back to that issue in a moment. And then two: If yes, what amount of compensatory damages, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover from the defendants? Then they fill in the blank. Three is the same sort of thing with punitives.

With regard to the first issue, the defamation issue. In looking into this more carefully I think that there is a determination as a matter of law that the Court is required -- is called on to make that says, did the defendants defame the plaintiff by the following statement or the following implied statement. Let me hear your thoughts about proceeding in that manner, whichever side wants to go first.

MS. WELLS: Your Honor, we generally try to track the pattern jury instructions. At defendant's request, we separated out actual malice for the person -- for the public figure instructions. But, certainly, the plaintiffs would have no objection to going back to the pattern jury instructions with -- let me raise one point though. With the per se -- I believe it was with the per se private figure, the pattern jury instructions have a part one question and a part two question.

THE COURT: All of a sudden the sound system went out and I had trouble hearing you.

MS. WELLS: I'll speak up, Your Honor. The pattern jury instructions have a part one and a part two, and the parties agree that it just seemed easier to separate those out as questions rather than having one question with different parts. So I'll let defendant speak as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Dean.

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MR. DEAN: Yes, sir. What has been proposed on the verdict sheet are the issues taken from the pattern instructions in terms of, did the defendant defame the plaintiff? And, then, if so what amount of actual damages and, if appropriate, what amount of punitive damages. We did propose a separate instruction for actual malice, really, for two reasons.

One is because it's subject to a different burden of proof. It's subject to the clear and convincing standard. Whereas, the other elements of defamation are subject to a did not know or failed to use ordinary care standard or, I'm sorry, preponderance of the evidence standard. And, so, Your Honor, we thought that the distinction there between the two burdens of proof made it appropriate to separate out that element from the others.

I believe both sides also -- although I haven't had an opportunity to review the plaintiff's proposed

jury instructions at this time. Both sides, I believe, have added to or proposed revisions to what the pattern uses for actual malice to incorporate the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit jurisprudence on that issue. So, in terms of the questions, we have tried to track with that one exception.

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To your question. We do agree, Your Honor, that the case should be submitted following the pattern instruction. It says -- asks whether the defendant defamed the plaintiff by asserting specific statements. And we do believe that those specific statements should be articulated for the jury. And where it is the Court's determination as to whether the statements are per se, the court makes that call. Obviously, if the Court determines a statement is not defamation per se then it's up to the jury.

But we do think it should be on specific statements rather than just simply saying, did video one defame the plaintiff? Did video two defame the plaintiff? And we would ask Your Honor that that's something that the parties crystallize -- really, that plaintiff crystallize in advance of trial so we know which statements are at issue.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there for a second.

Hasn't the plaintiff already done that by particularly

crystallizing the alleged defamatory elements by the way it's been alleged in the complaint.

MR. DEAN: That's what we argued at summary judgment, Your Honor. And, certainly, we believed at summary judgment that the statements were those that were alleged in the complaint. There was some disagreement from the plaintiff about that, and there was extensive discussions about what the statements were at summary judgment.

And I believe that some of the statements also -there were concessions during summary judgment aren't
defamatory. So the statement alone that Mr. Foval said
Ms. Teter is a trained bird-dogger. I believe they
conceded that statement on its own was not defamatory,
but they said there was some implied meaning elsewhere.

I agree with Your Honor that it should be limited to the statements articulated in the complaint, but I don't think -- I don't believe that's been the consistent position on the other side. From our vantage, we would like to know what the specific statements are in order to be able to prepare for trial.

THE COURT: Ms. Wells, I'll hear from you. I've already said my understanding is that you are -- you are whetted to what you've alleged in the complaint. Maybe not the precise wording, but certainly in terms of the

substance of what you've alleged in the complaint as being the particular express or implied statements that would be submitted to the jury as the alleged defamatory statements. Do you disagree with that?

MS. WELLS: I do not disagree with that, Your Honor. And if you look at our complaint. In Count One it alleges defamation, libel, and slander. It says the defendants made false, misleading, and defamatory written and verbal statements of or concerning Ms. Teter in video one and video two, which were published to third persons, causing injury to Ms. Teter's reputation.

It's our position that we did allege that the entirety of video one and the entirety of video two are the statements that are at issue. Your Honor, I would further say, it's looking at the entire statement that gives the meaning of those statements rather than picking out parts of those.

THE COURT: Mr. Dean, do you want to respond to that?

MR. DEAN: Well, obviously, I disagree, Your Honor. The pattern instruction says that do we defame by making certain statements? Video one is a 16-minute video. I don't know how the jury can be asked to opine if we simply said in the jury instructions, did video one defame the plaintiff? How are they supposed to ferret

out things like falsity of an accusation when only a small portion of the video relates to Ms. Teter? You can certainly look at the context of the video without saying that the entirety is a defamatory statement.

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I think the example I would point the Court to is the Renwick versus Greensboro News case that we've talked about extensively, Your Honor, the North Carolina Supreme Court case that talks about multiple interpretations. There the court looked at whether the whole article in that case made the implied statements that the plaintiff alleged. So it's really apples to oranges to say you have to look at the whole statement, thus the whole publication and, thus, the whole publication is the statement.

I think what is true is you have to identify in what specific way the publication defames you. And then the court, in terms of defamation per se, looks at the entire publication to see if the entire publication, or context of the publication within its four corners actually makes that statement. So I do believe, again, Your Honor, that there should be specific statements not simply asking the jury to opine on whether the entirety of video one and the entirety of video two is defamatory.

THE COURT: With that, Ms. Wells, I want to turn back to you, because here is why I don't understand your

argument at all. The paragraph that you were referring to in the complaint, paragraph 64, talks -- says the defendants made false, misleading, and defamatory written and verbal statements of or concerning Ms. Teter in video one and video two. It doesn't say the videos are defamatory. It says the defamation is contained in.

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And then in the very next paragraph you say the defendant's statements are false and misleading by their suggestion that Ms. Teter is homeless and suffers from mental illness. And then you give another one with regard to being a paid political activist sent to provoke violence. That's what you've alleged as the defamatory statements, and that's what I foresee at least being potential items to submit to the jury.

I think that there -- the question here in my mind is, is that one allegedly defamatory statement or is it two? In other words, is it an allegedly defamatory statement that Ms. Teter is a homeless, mentally ill person who was paid as a political activist to provoke violence? Or is that two separate statements to be submitted separately, or analyzed separately, as to whether they are defamatory? Do you disagree with that?

MS. WELLS: No, Your Honor. To answer your

question, we would take the position that that is two separate statements.

THE COURT: Okay. But with regard to what you were saying before of the question is whether or not the jury should be submitted the question of, is video one defamatory? I'm not seeing that. So are you leaving that idea behind?

MS. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor, I will leave that idea. I do think it's important that the jury be given the entire context, even under a per se, because those statements are being pulled out of that video just as the Renwick case establishes.

THE COURT: Well and from an evidentiary point of view you get to present your case in context. So I didn't -- I didn't hear Mr. Dean arguing anything different about that a moment ago, so I think that's clear.

Mr. Dean, am I understanding correctly you're not objecting to the presentation of the video; but you're just objecting to the idea of the video as a whole being presented to the potentially defamatory statement?

MR. DEAN: Exactly right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. One of the other things that you did in what you presented was it presented separate liability questions for each of the defendants. Now you-all know this case a whole lot better than I do -- that's the understatement of the week -- but I have always been

looking at this from the standpoint that the plaintiff's case rises and falls as to all three defendants equally. This indicates to me that maybe that's a misapprehension on my part. So either Ms. Wells or Mr. Dean either one of you.

Do we need to split it up as to the three defendants with separate questions?

MR. DEAN: Your Honor, from the defendant's perspective, we have not argued these issues before. We have always preserved them in our documents but there is no dispute that only one of the defendants published video one and video two. That's Project Veritas Action Fund. So we do believe that is an element that we want to preserve to ask the jury about for trial, you know, if it should even get that far. These are Project Veritas Action videos.

Action. Project Veritas is a separate entity who employs the investigators. But this isn't a case about negligence and, you know, of an employee. This is a case about defamation. And one of the elements is that the defendant published the statement. In this case, you know, video one and video two, undoubtedly, were -- I think we stipulated were published by Project Veritas Action. So we think that is an issue that requires

separation, although we don't believe that all three issues or the issues as to each defendant should reach the jury for that reason.

THE COURT: Okay. MS. Wells or Mr. Sasser, who wants to respond to that?

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, while Mr. O'Keefe is indeed an officer of Project Veritas Action Fund, they're all -- he and the other witnesses were all employees of Project Veritas. So I wouldn't think that their actions should be attributable to Project Veritas.

THE COURT: Well if I understood Mr. Dean's argument just now he's saying, in essence, the question as to Mr. O'Keefe and as to Project Veritas is likely not to survive the Rule 50 motion because they are not publishers. That was the thrust of his argument. And I'm not seeing how what you just said is responsive to that argument.

MR. SASSER: Mr. O'Keefe is the person in the video making the statements, and he's the person responsible and in charge of the company. I think that when publishing the statement he's the one saying the statement that goes out to the public. I think that's publishing it. You can publish it without being the publisher.

THE COURT: I'm trying to -- I haven't looked at

1 the videos since the summary judgment, and I'm trying to recall the videos, but I thought that the alleged defamation was the manner in which statements made 3 4 primarily by Mr. Foval were edited such as to cast a certain light upon the plaintiff. 5 6 MR. SASSER: Yes, sir. 7 THE COURT: Now you're saying, no, it's Mr. O'Keefe who is making the statements. And I'm not 8 9 remembering what is in those videos that would be -- that 10 would support the statement you just made. So remind me 11 of what I'm forgetting. SASSER: Well what he says specifically about 12 MR. 13 Mr. O'Keefe is --14 THE COURT: Ms. Teter. 15 I'm sorry. He's saying I remember MR. SASSER: this lady, her name is Shirley Teter and she claims she 16 17 was assaulted at a Trump rally; the media played it for 18 days. That's probably all he says directly about her. 19 There are other places where he refers to agitators who 20 are trained to come in and do these sorts of things. 21 I think that holds him and, by respondeat superior, also 22 holds Project Veritas as well. He also says at the 23 beginning of the video that what you're going to hear 24 will disturb you; there may be criminal ramifications, 25 according to our lawyer.

THE COURT: Well it seems like that -- that's 1 2 going to be very fact specific. In other words, you're 3 going to have to present evidence at trial which, of 4 course, would be in the form of the video that I could look at ahead of time as to whether there is anything 5 that Mr. O'Keefe individually does that constitutes the 6 7 making of a defamatory assertion and thereby constitutes an element of the publication of that assertion. 8 9 MR. SASSER: We will have evidence that he takes 10 credit for it, Your Honor, and that he has in his book --11 Is that even relevant? THE COURT: Is that not something that is to be determined from the face of the 12 13 video itself? Either he did it or he didn't. You have 14 video evidence that answers that question definitively; 15 right? 16 Yes, sir, we will present that. SASSER: 17 THE COURT: Okay. Well you say you will present 18 that. It's just in that video that's the subject of the 19 lawsuit; right? 20 SASSER: Yes, sir. MR. 21 THE COURT: Okay. I just want to understand your 22 I don't want to go off on a tangent. It seems to me -- this is related to the verdict form issue but 23 24 not something that actually shows up on the verdict form. 25 This whole issue of the plaintiff being a limited purpose

public figure because, it seems to me, even though that 1 is a fact based determination, the case law is pretty clear that that is to be -- that determination is to be 3 4 made as a matter of law by the court. In fact, I think the Fourth Circuit says that, quite specifically, in 5 Foretich. Does anybody disagree with that? 6 7 WELLS: No, Your Honor. MS. THE COURT: Mr. 8 Dean. 9 MR. DEAN: No, Your Honor. Your Honor, I believe 10 the record was essentially fully developed on that point 11 at summary judgment. THE COURT: Well you say it's fully developed on 12 13 But I have to make that determination based on what evidence is presented at trial, don't I? Is it 14 15 entirely independent on what is presented then? If there is some elements of limited purpose public figure that 16 17 were presented for summary judgment that aren't 18 presented, now I have to make the determination based on 19 that new universe of evidence, don't I? 20 SASSER: Your Honor, I'm afraid I -- I agree MR. 21 Dean on that. I think Your Honor may well be 22 able to decide that on the forecast of evidence, since 23 it's a legal issue. 24 THE COURT: Well how can I do it based on a

forecast of evidence where it is then determinative of

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the case? In other words, in summary judgment I'm going on a forecast of evidence saying, well, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this is a possible outcome and therefore I don't make a factual determination. I don't make a determination on the facts, I make a determination on what the evidence could tend to show. It may or may not show that at trial. In fact, I've seen that a lot of times where I deny summary judgment, we get to trial and the plaintiff's case just comes unraveled.

It strikes me that this is something that's totally different here. That especially looking at what the Fourth Circuit says in *Foretich* that it is -- they made a determination at the appellate level based not on forecasts of evidence but based on the evidence that was actually in the record before them. You know, the hard and fast -- this is what the court has and, therefore, the court makes a determination. Especially since you and Mr. Dean agree on this I feel like maybe there's something here I'm missing. Convince me why I'm wrong.

MR. DEAN: I'll take the first stab at it, Your Honor, if that's all right with Mr. Sasser. I think here one major point is that, regardless of the specific posture, this case is a defamation case. We agree that the facts are undisputed. So the facts that the parties are relying on to -- for the Court's determination on the

public figure issue aren't disputed. Whether Ms. Teter made certain statements to the media and how those statements were broadcast, that's not in dispute between the parties.

THE COURT: Let me stop you for a second because there's another element of this that would seem relevant to this, and that is whether or not Ms. Teter in fact -- the term I keep using is "lit the fuse;" started the entire process. That's one of the reasons why I left this case consolidated with the Campbell case until it went away. Because it seemed to me that that determination of what happened in that altercation may not be dispositive but it certainly is a factor in whether or not quote, unquote, Ms. Teter lit the fuse. And that's a factor in whether or not she injected herself into the situation so as to have volunteered that second Foretich element. Am I misunderstanding something?

MR. DEAN: Well I think, Your Honor, that from the defendant's perspective, whether Ms. Teter inserted herself into the debate, when you look at the case law it's generally done in terms of what statements a party has made or what they have said publicly on public controversy. So there are two types of limited purpose public figure. There's a limited public figure; there's

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an involuntary public figure. I think Ms. Teter's
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    conduct in terms of the altercation is probably
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    involuntary public figure analysis. But on public figure
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   analysis says the way she behaved afterwards, we believe,
   was sufficient in terms of calling the news back and
 5
    asking them to print the question about someone punching
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    -- a Trump supporter punching an old lady is deplorable;
   participating with the media, and advocates from advocacy
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   groups -- activist groups. We think all that was
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    sufficient. I would say Your Honor --
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          THE COURT: Well regardless of whether you think
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    it's sufficient -- I mean, I realize that's your argument
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          MR.
               DEAN:
                       Right.
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          THE COURT: -- but I need to make a determination
   based on all of the facts that are pertinent to the
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    question. I'm just wondering, how can I do that without
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   having heard what that evidence actually is about the
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   altercation?
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                       Right. And, Your Honor, if Your Honor
          MR.
               DEAN:
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    feels like that is something that's essential to the case
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    -- I agree that's not fully developed in summary
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    judgment, and that's something that would have to be
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   presented at trial.
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          THE COURT: Well then let me ask the next
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question. Is that among the evidence that is going to be presented at trial? Obviously if you-all aren't going to be presenting evidence on that, maybe I do have the full universe of evidence to decide this case. I'm certainly not telling anybody how they need to try their lawsuit.

MR. DEAN: So, Your Honor, this actually gets at what was a motion in limine for us. The defendant's position is that Ms. Teter's testimony about what happened at the altercation and in her claims after that are relevant because those obviously were in the public eye, what brought her to the public eye, and were the direct subject of our second video.

Our position is that whether or not Mr. Campbell in fact punched Ms. Teter in the face, swung reflexively, or didn't touch her at all, isn't relevant to this case because neither one of the videos either affirms or denies that that punch happened.

In the first video Mr. O'Keefe states Ms. Teter claims she was assaulted. And in the second video it shows Ms. Teter's claim that Mr. Campbell cold-cocked her, and then her later claim he might have hit her with a back hand. Our position is, with a 401 issue, that evidence is not relevant because it doesn't control either defamation issue.

We've also argued, Your Honor, that it's

prejudicial under Rule 403 because Ms. Teter had an opportunity to litigate the truth with Mr. Campbell and elected not to do that. That case settled. This is not a case about assault. I think there's a real possibility that bringing in third parties in to testify about the assault is simply going to encourage a jury to rule on a motion -- to rule on passion but, maybe, more importantly, to rule based on whether or not they think she was punched, and that's not the issue.

Whether she was or wasn't punched doesn't control whether our videos were defamatory. So our position is that that evidence should not be admitted at trial whether or not the parties have it available.

THE COURT: Well we've strayed pretty far afield of where I started with this particular discussion.

Mr. Sasser, let me turn back to you. Is that evidence that you're planning to present at trial that you feel is relevant to the issues here.

MR. SASSER: Very briefly, Your Honor. I was hoping to address the issue you're asking him about which is the evidence of public figure or not a public figure.

And I think -- I think I agree with him that those are things that really cannot be in dispute. What's in the newspaper on September 14th or September 15th is kind of undisputed. Those facts are there, and they're in front

of the court, and Your Honor can make that decision without the trial. I think that would shorten their case, because I think a lot of their case is about whether she's a public figure or not. And then I'll be glad to address the issue of, you know, whether she got assaulted.

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But I think if he and I are in agreement that the facts as to whether she's a public figure are undisputed, because there's a number of times she was interviewed and that sort of thing, I think that issue is --

THE COURT: I don't suspect you-all are in agreement as to whether she's a public figure or not. I get the feeling you-all are in strong disagreement about the issue.

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir. That's the issue we raised and briefed and argued on summary judgment. But the facts -- we think the facts are established because they can't be disputed, and Your Honor can decide that.

But --

THE COURT: Let me go back to my other question which is where I started with you a moment ago. Are you planning to present evidence of the actual altercation between Mr. Campbell and Ms. Teter?

MR. SASSER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, if you are, then what is the

relevance of that if it is not relevant to the question of whether or not she, in essence, became a volunteer?

In other words, she stepped into the situation rather than the situation coming at her.

MR. SASSER: Because the jury is going to want to know. How did this video come into existence? We've got to tell them that she was at a rally and something happened at the rally. Maybe there's a dispute about what happened at the rally. That's not a major portion of our case, but we think it's important just to add context and let the jury know this is what happened. And then a month later this video comes out.

If we start out just talking about their video they're going to wonder well is did she get assaulted or not? They don't need to decide -- I agree with him they don't need to decide whether she got assaulted, but I think it's going to be the kind of thing -- it's going to be the elephant in the room.

THE COURT: Well Mr. Dean.

MR. DEAN: Just quickly, Your Honor. I'd say that many of the facts surrounding the altercation are already in the record as well including, you know, from summary judgment. So we have Ms. Teter's testimony that she engaged Mr. Campbell, you know, with her statements about learning to speak Russian; we have her admission

that she followed Mr. Campbell; and then there's disputes about what happened next. But what's in the press coverage of that is essentially what the parties, I think, would present at trial.

So I think that there is a significant volume of evidence not just in the press but in the testimony that was presented at summary judgment and in the answer to request for admission that shed light on that that essentially would just be repeated at trial.

THE COURT: Well it's going to be repeated at trial anyway, isn't it? Because if I make a determination based on what you filed for summary judgment, and then based on that determination you do not present a sufficient evidentiary basis to or foundation to support that finding, when it goes up to the Fourth Circuit, which I expect it will regardless of who wins, they're going to make a new determination not based on what you submitted at summary judgment but what was presented at trial. So, I mean, all you're doing is hanging me out to dry; right?

MR. DEAN: Not intentionally.

MR. SASSER: I was going to say the same thing you were. I understand the judge -- Your Honor's question. Maybe a summary judgment decision, or a ruling on that, would include the undisputed evidence that the

parties presented at summary judgment. I don't know. If you want me to go back to the issue of their motion in limine and the assault I will address a couple of those issues.

One is that video two says she changed her mind about whether she was assaulted or not. So I think there is an issue about the circumstances of the assault. So that is relevant to the truth of video two. Also, video one talks about her being out there and acting like a bird-dogger. So what she was doing and how she was acting, I think, is also relevant to the truth of video one, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I didn't follow that last part because the whole "bird-dogger" part I do not understand as being something that you have alleged in your complaint as constituting a defamatory assertion regarding Ms. Teter. So why is that even relevant?

MR. SASSER: I did make that concession at summary judgment, Your Honor, because it's a confusion about a bird-dogger and a trained agitator, and I think they are lumping all those in together in their video. Where, normally, if you're talking about a bird-dogger who stands up and asks questions and is kind of like a pain to a candidate, that's one thing. But what they're actually describing in the video was someone who's out

there inciting violence. And there may be some confusion about "bird-dogger" meaning more than what Mr. Foval described it. Because the whole context of the video -- they're describing what both Mr. O'Keefe and Mr. Foval called agitators who are trained to provoke violence.

THE COURT: In light of the way you have cabined your allegations in the complaint, why is that relevant other than to present the full context of the statements that do form the basis of your allegations in the complaint?

MR. SASSER: I think it's relevant to show that she was -- whether she was inciting violence or not, which is, I think, one of the things Your Honor really focused on as being potentially defamatory.

THE COURT: Okay. Well I -- particularly, in light of the fact that you-all take the view that you do, I'll take another look at that. But I'm not making any promises that I'm going to make a determination about limited purpose public figure before the close of all the evidence. Obviously, that determination needs to be made before the case gets submitted to the jury because it dictates how the jury will be instructed. But I just -- I do not see the procedural mechanism by which there is a record that is preserved to support my finding unless it is the record from the trial. That's where I am right

now, but I'll give that some more thought.

MR. SASSER: I may be getting way out of my skis here, Your Honor, but the stipulations may shed some light on that. I'm not sure we've stipulated far enough to give Your Honor some of what would be necessary to make that decision but I'm just thinking out loud.

THE COURT: Well and I -- I actually read through the stipulations again this morning, particularly with an eye toward that issue. Obviously, I did it in something of a hurry. But my shoot from the hip reaction was there wasn't enough there. And maybe you-all can have further stipulations to where we can do that before the trial starts. But I'm sure you have bigger fish to fry between now and the 20th.

Is there anything else that you-all want to discuss about the verdict form, the issues to be submitted to the jury, and to the extent that it affects how, ultimately, the jury would be instructed? Any of those issues that you want to talk about? Mr. Dean.

MR. DEAN: Your Honor, the issue of libel per se versus libel per quod that both sides have highlighted. In that event the only relevant evidence as to libel per se is video one and video two. So I think both parties -- they'll correct me if I speak out of school -- would be -- you know, in this instance it seems like a ruling

whether it's based on -- couched as under the summary 1 judgment or as another type of pretrial ruling on those 3 points could impact the way that the evidence is 4 presented to the jury. But it could certainly impact how the parties speak about the case in their arguments and 5 how the parties speak about the case between now and the 6 7 beginning of trial. So that's the only other issue that we would raise as having a potential impact. And it is 8 9 one where the evidence at trial simply won't be relevant, 10 because the mandate from the North Carolina Supreme Court is that only the publications can be considered. 11 12 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Sasser, do you want to 13 respond to that? 14 MR. SASSER: Your Honor, as much as I hate to aid 15 and abet Mr. Dean and asking the court to do more work, 16 I kind of agree that Your Honor can look at video one and 17 video two and determine from the entirety, the four 18 corners of those documents, whether it's per se or per 19 quod. 20 THE COURT: And then are you in agreement with 21 Dean that that is going to make a substantial 22 difference as to how the case is presented to the court 23 and to the jury? 24 MR. SASSER: I may not be in agreement on that,

I think that we may be presenting in a lot

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Your Honor.

of the same material regardless of that decision. 1 THE COURT: Well it seems to me that what Dean is saying is a lot of that would be 3 4 inadmissible. And if -- based on -- say, for instance, I make a ruling that if it's anything it's libel per se. 5 If I'm understanding Mr. Dean correctly he's saying, 6 well, then under existing case law the only thing that 7 the jury can consider is the document itself, the videos. 8 9 Do you disagree with that? 10 MR. SASSER: Yes, sir, I do disagree with that with regard to a number of issues. 11 12 THE COURT: Like what? 13 MR. SASSER: Such as damages. Such as --14 THE COURT: Well let me recast my question because 15 I don't think Mr. Dean is saying you didn't present any 16 other evidence as to any other aspect of the lawsuit. 17 You still have to prove the falsity. So you have to 18 present some sort of context that shows that the implied 19 statement was in fact not true. You still -- if you're 20 seeking damages you have to present your evidence of 21 He's not saying that -- at least I don't damages. 22 understand Mr. Dean to be saying that you are limited to 23 presenting evidence as to that one element to the 24 exclusion of the other elements of your case. But as to 25 the element of defamation he's saying that's it; that's

1 all you get to present.

MR. SASSER: If Your Honor was to decide that it was defamatory per se.

THE COURT: That's what I'm talking about. I'm not -- I haven't made that ruling. I'm just saying hypothetically if I make the ruling that it is, if anything, libel per se, how -- does that not limit, or does that limit your evidentiary presentation that you said no? Why not?

MR. SASSER: I think whether or not it's an element of the tort is still relevant that certain people saw this and realized it was defamatory. Even though I don't need to prove that it goes to what happened here. It may not be part of the defamation per se whether it's defamation but it sure goes to the overall presentation of our case.

THE COURT: Well maybe I could cut to the chase by asking Mr. Dean, more particularly, what is the evidence that you understand that the plaintiff has in her quiver that would not be admissible if I make a determination that the videos, if anything, constitute libel per se?

MR. DEAN: I think it affects two key pieces of information that are highly in dispute whether admissible under any circumstances. One of that would be these YouTube comments. If it is defamation per se the

plaintiff doesn't have to prove that a third party heard and interpreted the statement as defamatory because the Court has already made that determination as a matter of law. And then secondarily if it's defamation per se the plaintiff -- you know, depending on their constitutional analysis of actual malice, the plaintiff is entitled to presume damages and doesn't have to prove pecuniary damages as she would have to for a defamation per quod.

Again, in this case, there is -- there's a dispute about whether even if plaintiff proceeds on the per quod theory she can put into evidence what she wants to on special damages. But I think if it's defamation per se she doesn't have a need to. So, in fact, while she could put in evidence --

THE COURT: Let me stop you for a second because my question is, what is it that you understand would be part of the plaintiff's case that then would not be -- not come in? It would not be admissible because of a determination that it is, if anything, per se.

MR. DEAN: I think it dramatically impacts the admissibility on relevance grounds of the YouTube comments and any third party testimony. There's some in the depositions whether where they've attempted to use third parties where they said they viewed our testimony. Any of that testimony is inadmissible and --

THE COURT: Let's say for the fact that somebody 1 2 else viewed the video that's relevant to publication that's an element that the plaintiff has to prove. Why 3 4 wouldn't it come in then? It may be cumulative. I think it 5 MR. would be cumulative of publication. And, again, when 6 7 it's issues like the YouTube comments, you know, the risk of prejudice by those comments is so significant that the 8 9 cumulative effect of showing that someone else saw the video. 10 11 THE COURT: Again, I'm sorry to keep interrupting 12 you --13 MR. DEAN: That's all right. 14 THE COURT: -- to try to get to the point. 15 Cumulativeness is cumulativeness regardless of the reason 16 why it's admissible. Say, for instance, with the YouTube 17 comments. If the plaintiff is offering the YouTube 18 comments to show them as having spurred her anxiety, 19 therefore it's relevant to damages something of that 20 nature. Then, yeah, after two or three of them it 21 becomes very cumulative. 22 And if -- if they keep going with that you'll 23 object; I may sustain it. If they keep going with it you 24 might object and I might overrule it, but then the jury 25 penalizes them for just belaboring the point.

doesn't get to the question of whether or not those

comments would come in. And it seems like, at least on

that scenario -- I'm not previewing any rulings here.

But on that scenario at least some of them would come in,

wouldn't they?

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MR. DEAN: I don't think so. Because it's a weighing analysis under Rule 403 of marginal probative value versus risk of cumulative waste of time. And if we're talking about defamation per se, the probative value is, I think, nonexistent but, in any event, is far less than the probative value that it's defamation per quod depending what they're using the piece of evidence for. And I would say the other piece of evidence I didn't use earlier is this whole side about her medical expenses and neurofeedback therapy. Certainly she could present that if she wanted to on a per se claim, but she would not be required to.

THE COURT: As to this question: Then why does that make any difference? If she can present it either way she's going to make -- Mr. Sasser and his cohorts here are going to make a determination as to whether it's a beneficial part of their case. It's not a question of whether or not it's admissible.

MR. DEAN: That's right, Your Honor. I agree with you, Your Honor. I think the biggest reason is for

the party's clarity. Frankly, the biggest reason for a ruling on this issue is for the party's clarity and the way they think about this case in the way they prepare for the case in terms of what themes and what evidence and those types of things. It may not, at the end of the day, make a huge difference in the presentation of the evidence. A ruling on defamation per se would take elements off the table that Ms. Teter is otherwise required to prove.

THE COURT: Mr. Sasser, do you have anything else you want to say on this point?

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, your questions for Mr. Dean make it very clear that I cannot possibly add anything that would be of any more assistance to the Court. Your Honor understands the issues quite well. If we're going to put in her medical records, yes, we can do it under both of those. It might be more relevant under one than it is under the others. But I think Your Honor understandings this issue.

THE COURT: You guys are getting so agreeable with each other it seems like you ought to be able to settle the case. I wasn't expecting this level of agreeability between the -- I will take a look at that issue. I think under the law this is very different from what we were talking about a minute ago because I think the

determination of per se versus per quod is something to be made quote, unquote from the four corners of a document. I hesitate because it's hard for me to think about a video as a document, but within defamation law it is. But it's something to be determined from the four corners of the document, and the document is something that is before the court. It's the same document that's going to be going to the Fourth Circuit when whichever one of you is on the short end of this case takes it to the Fourth Circuit. So I can make that determination before trial.

And I will take a close look at that, but I'll tell you where I am right now. It seems to me that these videos are, if anything, libel per se. I have trouble seeing how this fits into a libel per quod box. I haven't read all the cases yet so I reserve ruling on that. I'll let you know in some form as to what my determination is, but that's where I am at this point, and I will say, particularly in light of the manner in which this was pleaded. In other words, the pleadings in this case point to the videos in particular and how these two issues are presented to the public in these two videos is either libelous on its face or it's not. So that's where I am on that point right now.

Are there any other issues regarding the verdict

form, the manner in which the jury would be instructed -not specific instructions. I'll work on those between
now and the trial. But all of these sort of broader
legal issues that we're dealing with before we get into
things like motions in limine, the depositions.

Hearing none, let's move on from there. The first thing that I want to address, so that I don't forget it, is there was this individual named Leslie Boyd, who is apparently under subpoena, who sent a letter to the court which then we filed, because the Court would treat that as a Motion to Quash the subpoena. There was some indication that you-all have resolved the issue of how to handle that. So is that resolved?

MR. DEAN: Very close, Your Honor. We agreed amongst the parties to four stipulations, I think, that cover the bulk of Ms. Boyd's testimony. There were about maybe 20 or so lines of deposition testimony that the defendants would offer that the plaintiffs don't stipulate to and that they would like an opportunity to be able to counter designate. And if the Court is agreeable to allowing us to designate those lines of testimony which are included in the motion that we've already filed with the Court they're already in the record. And for the plaintiff to be able to counter designate those then we are happy to present Ms. Boyd by

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the stipulations and by the limited deposition testimony.
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           THE COURT: So am I understanding correctly that
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    even though Ms. Boyd may not be technically "unavailable"
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   within the meaning of Rule 32 you're willing to stipulate
    that she is unavailable so that her deposition may be
 5
   used.
 6
 7
          MR.
                       Yes, Your Honor, and we filed a motion
                DEAN:
    to that effect.
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 9
           THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sasser, I see you nodding.
10
   Do you agree with that?
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          MR.
                SASSER: Your Honor, we would like the
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    opportunity to counter designate if that motion is
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              There's another issue that is relevant based on
14
   our other discussions. She is a witness solely on the
15
    issue of public figure. And if that issue is resolved
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   before trial she wouldn't be necessary at all, along with
17
   several other witnesses.
18
           THE COURT: Well, regardless of whether you
19
    stipulate that she's unavailable and make counter
20
   designations, it doesn't mean that the defendant has to
21
    offer that deposition.
22
                SASSER: Yes, sir.
          MR.
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           THE COURT: So, I mean, that's a determination
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    that can be made then. And if it is something -- again,
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   my frame of mind still is if that's evidence that is
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relevant to the question of whether or not Ms. Teter is
 1
   a special purpose public figure, then if they want to
   present that evidence, if it is in fact pertinent to it,
 3
 4
    then I'll hear it.
               DEAN: Your Honor.
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          MR.
          THE COURT: Yes Mr. Dean.
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                       I apologize, Your Honor. I think if
          MR.
               DEAN:
   we could -- if we could get some clarity on the
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 9
   designations in terms of the timing. We designated, like
    I said, I think 20 or so lines which we will treat as
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   direct testimony. So I assume there's not going to be a
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   huge volume of counter designations. But could we set a
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   deadline for when the counter designations are due so
14
   that if there are any objections to the counter
15
   designations we can make sure those are presented to you
    in time to have a deposition ready to go?
16
                                               This is one
    that would not be presented by video, so there's no clips
17
18
    to be cut. It's just a matter of knowing what we're
19
   going to be reading.
20
          THE COURT: Well, Mr. Sasser, how long do you need
21
    to figure out your counter designations?
22
                SASSER: Tuesday should be fine, Your Honor.
          MR.
23
          THE COURT: Can you do it more quickly than that?
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    I was -- I figured you'd tell me, you know, 9 o'clock
   Monday morning. How short is this deposition?
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          MR.
               SASSER:
                         I'm not sure.
 2
          THE COURT: I mean, Mr. Dean said his part -- I
 3
   thought he said is 20 lines.
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          MR.
               SASSER: Maybe an hour long. If Monday
   morning is the time Your Honor would like then we could
 5
   do that.
 6
 7
          THE COURT: How about I give you until 5 o'clock
   on Monday?
               That gives you all day on Monday to get it
 8
 9
   done. It doesn't sound like you're going to need that
   much time.
10
11
          MR.
               SASSER: Thank you, Your Honor. We will do
12
   that.
13
          THE COURT:
                      To this point, though, do I understand
14
   correctly that there aren't any objections regarding the
15
   Leslie Boyd deposition? Is that right?
16
               SASSER:
                          I'm not sure, Your Honor.
          MR.
                                                     I would
17
   like the same time to do the objections and counter
18
   designations.
19
          THE COURT: Okay. That's one of the reasons I
20
   raised it. Objections and counter designations by Monday
21
   at 5:00.
22
               Dean, Mr. Montecalvo, objections to counter
          Mr.
23
   designations by Tuesday at 5:00?.
24
          The next thing that I wanted to address were the
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   deposition designations because, I have to admit, I have
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never been so overwhelmed with deposition testimony for a trial. But then again I have never had a trial actually go to a jury in which the parties were proposing to present seven witnesses by way of video deposition.

Just as an aside, the jury is going to hate you just so that you know. That is very counter to their expectations of how a trial is done. Be that as it may, you try the case however you want to do it. It puts an awfully big burden on the Court to go through all these because you-all filed those deposition designations -- I think we finally got them in the ECF system yesterday, and there was like 1,700 pages.

How much time do you need to edit the videos?

Because this is going to take time. If I had any idea that you-all were doing this -- and this isn't your fault. It's my fault. If I had any idea you were doing this I would have given you a deadline of three weeks ago.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, we have already started trying to cut back on that. I have sent the other side a shorter version of James O'Keefe, and I plan to do that with the other witnesses as well and try to cut them to the bone. Basically, these were, I think, at least from our side and maybe from the other's, we just wanted to make sure that everything we felt was relevant would be

in there in case we needed it.

Now, looking at it from the perspective of cutting the video that somebody's going to have to look at for an hour or so, we're being a lot more careful. There's going to be some duplication on those on a couple of videos but I'm going to cut that out. So that was my goal was to get that done by the end of this week. But I plan to keep slugging away at that with the cooperation of the other side.

THE COURT: Well, in light of that, what is it that you want me to do? Do you want me to wait?

MR. SASSER: I think it would be a good idea for Your Honor to give us a little more time to try to narrow the universe of what Your Honor needs to consider, because we would hate for you to have to consider something that we've decided voluntarily to omit. If I'm speaking for both sides --

THE COURT: Mr. Dean, Mr. Montecalvo, what say the two of you as to the timetable for getting me what I really need to be looking at on this.

MR. DEAN: I'd say it needs to be a pretty swift turn around, Your Honor, only because, unfortunately, I think there will be a good bit remaining for the Court. You know, obviously, if you're at trial and a line of questioning were begun and an objection were sustained,

it would end. But in a deposition the questioning goes
on because it's a deposition and that's the format. So
while I think there's probably only eight or ten
different types of issues the Court's going to see,
there's just many instances of those.

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what's been designated I don't want there to be a false impression that that's going to leave the Court with very little. Unfortunately, I think there will still be a little bit. I don't think it would give the Court sufficient time, given what you said about the week prior to trial, if we don't get those to you still fairly early next week.

THE COURT: By what date do you need the answers in order to edit these videos?

MR. SASSER: I'd say a few days before trial,
Your Honor. But I have another suggestion. If the Court
gives us some guidance on the motions in limine I think
that will -- at least if Your Honor says none of this
stuff is coming in I'll cut that out of my designations,
and I would assume that the other side would as well. Or
if Your Honor says that stuff is coming in under the
motion in limine, then I would expect their objections to
be withdrawn.

THE COURT: Okay. Well and we might make some

headway there. Often though with motions in limine it it's dependent on what foundation is presented in order to make the evidence admissible. So we might make some headway; we might not. But we'll get to the motions in limine here shortly. That's helpful.

I'll be candid with you. One of my reservations about the timetable is the week of the 13th is the court's district conference. So I'm completely bottled up that week to where I will have very little opportunity to do anything during that week. So, for instance, if I don't get the questions from you until Monday, the 13th, I don't know how I'm going to get you an answer before the day you're picking the jury. So let's see how much headway we make when we get to the motions in limine.

Just going through my list here. Is there anything else that any of you want to address before we move on to the motions in limine? Okay.

Let me get rearranged here so I can get everything in front of me regarding the motions. Well the very first motion in limine is the one that we've already spent some time on, and that has to do with the evidence of the altercation. To me, regardless of the issue of limited purpose public person, public figure, that at least has some 401 relevance as to whether the plaintiff was one who provoked violence or had the intent to

provoke violence. So it seems that there is 401 relevance.

Now there was some hint that this evidence might become cumulative under 403. But I -- I don't know cumulative until I see it. I don't know that there's a lot more that I can say about that. I think you-all know what I'm talking about. Obviously, if you talk about some topic from a couple of different angles it's not really cumulative yet because you're giving that flavor of different perspectives. However, there is a point that you reach fairly quickly where the jury starts rolling their eyes. And when the jury starts rolling their eyes I start sustaining objections as to cumulative under 403.

Does that give you enough guidance to understand where I stand regarding evidence of the altercation?

MR. SASSER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Dean.

MR. DEAN: Certainly, Your Honor. We would argue that there are other factors as well. Misleading the jury as to what they are to decide and creating prejudice by drawing a connection as if there's some link between the defendants in this case and Mr. Campbell. But we understand your ruling, and we'll raise appropriate objections at the time of trial. If I may. I understand

that the witnesses on this issue will be live witnesses. 1 2 MR. That's correct. SASSER: 3 MR. DEAN: We can raise those issues. We will e 4 raise any issues as appropriate when the witness is on the stand. 5 6 THE COURT: Is Mr. Campbell going to be 7 testifying? 8 MR. SASSER: Not from us, Your Honor. 9 MR. DEAN: We have Mr. Campbell's deposition 10 designated and Mrs. Campbell's deposition designated, and 11 we have some rebuttal witnesses who will testify live as 12 well. Mr. Campbell lives in South Carolina, is older 13 and not in good health, and is unwilling and unable to 14 travel for trial. 15 THE COURT: I see. 16 The next motion in limine had to do with 17 special damages. Here a lot of the argument had to do 18 the necessity of special damages and if there is a claim 19 under per quod, et cetera. It seems to me that this 20 boils down to a fairly simple issue. And that is Rule 21 9(g) says special damages have to be specifically 22 pleaded, and I don't see where they were pleaded. 2.3 missing something. 2.4 MS. RINI: I briefed this, Your Honor. I believe 25 you're correct. We would argue that Ms. Teter's

1 complaint says that she will incur out-of-pocket expenses
2 and other damages because she continues to live in fear
3 for her safety and that --

THE COURT: Yeah. How does that qualify under 9(g)? I mean that's -- that's not even in the ballpark, is it?

MS. RINI: Well we would argue that even if there is not -- even if it's an improbable factual allegation at the time of the filing of the complaint, that during discovery there might be items in evidence that come up that could show an incurring of out-of-pocket expenses to show that she lived in fear for her safety. And there's also allegations in the complaint that she suffered emotional distress and that defendant's videos have caused mental distress of a very serious nature.

THE COURT: Well what I understood to be the focus of this motion in limine was the evidence regarding the neurofeedback therapy and any costs related to that. I'm having trouble seeing how you have given notice of any --well and 9(g) is -- it's not a notice pleading. It says if any item of special damage is claimed it must be specifically stated. Explain to me how you think that the neurofeedback therapy evidence and bills fall within that provision.

MS. RINI: It would be a broad reading of the

three portions of the complaint that we've cited to. 1 three paragraphs of the complaint we've cited to -- and I would remind Your Honor this is only to show defamation 3 4 per quod. It doesn't show anything with regard to defamation per se because there is no special damages for 5 need to show defamation for per se. 6 7 If you're only going on a defamation THE COURT: per se theory then you wouldn't be presenting any of 8 9 this. 10 MS. RINI: We would still be presenting it but we would not have had to alleged special damages in our 11 12 complaint, because defamation per quod requires as an 13 element of defamation per quod that the plaintiff provide 14 -- that the plaintiff allege special damages in her 15 complaint. 16 THE COURT: That's not how I read Rule 9(g). Rule 9(g) says if an item of special damage is claimed. 17 Ιt 18 doesn't say if claimed pursuant to libel per quod. 19 MS. Right, Your Honor. RINI: 20 It says if it's claimed it must be THE COURT: 21 specifically stated. So even if you're going on a libel 22 per se theory, in order to recover those special damages 23 you have to have pleaded them. That's what 9(q) says, isn't it? 24

You're correct, Your Honor.

In order

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MS.

RINI:

to show cumulative damages or, I think, presumed damages, 1 we would still introduce evidence of neurotherapy expenses and records but it wouldn't be for special 3 4 damages. So there would still be evidence of --THE COURT: How are you going to get that in for 5 -- treat them separately; presume damages or punitives? 6 7 I mean isn't that just a back door way of saying, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we really want you to put this 8 in the blank? 9 It would tend to show that Ms. 10 MS. RINI: Teter had some serious anxiety as a result of these videos, and 11 12 that she sought out special help for that. 13 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Dean, what do you have to 14 say? 15 Well a couple of responses. MR. DEAN: As to just the portion of the 9(g), we do think they have other 16 17 problems on this evidence. I agree with Your Honor that 18 medical expenses are pecuniary damages and they should be specifically stated. I don't think that you can end 19 20 around the pleading rule by offering them for some other 21 purpose like showing emotional distress. Allegations of 22 emotional distress, as a matter of law, aren't sufficient 23 to show special damages. There's lots of cases we cited 24 to that effect so I won't belabor that.

I would also just point out to a bigger issue with

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this type of evidence, Your Honor, which is a causation issue. I don't think Ms. Teter may testify that she has anxiety that was caused by something specific that necessitated medical treatment, particularly in light of her past history of anxiety and the many other anxiety inducing conditions and stressors in her life that she reported to her therapist --

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THE COURT: Let me stop you for a second because that goes to the question of whether or not Ms. Teter lays an adequate foundation for the admissibility of something that would otherwise be admissible. Right now, since this is in the form of a motion in limine, I want to deal first with the issue of is it admissible? Even if she lays the foundation that you're talking about, is she going to be able to get it in?

MR. DEAN: Is it admissible? That's a little different from our motion. We have not argued that the medical expenses -- our bases for our motion in limine, Your Honor, are the failure to plead and then the fact that this evidence was not provided during discovery. Some of it wasn't provided until after summary judgment. So these are really Rule 9(g) and then Rule 26 and Rule 37 motions.

Your Honor, the notion that this evidence was ever disclosed to us is belied by the plaintiff's counsel's

correspondence with us. When they produced documents to us in late March, after the summary judgment argument, they produced a set of Medicare records. We wrote back and said, on the face of these records it looks like they were downloaded in October. Why weren't they provided to us? And in, you know, a candid response, counsel wrote back and said that they didn't appreciate the relevance of Dina Rose, who was the neurofeedback therapist at the time that the records were downloaded; and they didn't appreciate their relevance, they said, until the last week of discovery.

So if, Your Honor, they didn't even appreciate that these neurofeedback records were relevant until the last week of discovery, it is impossible that the complaint -- the initial disclosures or the interrogatory answer that they provided could have disclosed these medical expenses to us.

So, you know, I'd say that even apart from 9(g), a bigger problem that we have with this medical expense theory is the only thing we received within the discovery period -- it was only three or four days before the discovery period closed were copies of the treatment records themselves received, but no copies of anything relating to expenses, and nothing that tied us to that treatment.

And I'd point out, as we did at summary judgment, Your Honor, those records that we received they didn't put us on notice that Ms. Teter was going to be seeking medical expenses from these defendants, because the medical records don't mention these defendants or defendant's videos or YouTube comments. So our bigger problem with this evidence is that the actual documentation of expenses, Medicare records, those weren't produced until late March of this year, and we never had any notice of those records beforehand.

As to medical expenses generally. We asked specifically from Ms. Teter, what are your out-of-pocket expenses? That phrase she used in paragraph 61. We asked an interrogatory. It was our first interrogatory directly on that point. The only thing that she disclosed was the costs of buying a new cell phone.

And if you go back further to her initial disclosures she claims that she is seeking medical expenses in a specific amount of, like, \$2,504. And the documentation that she provided is an emergency room bill from the time -- from the date when she had an altercation with Mr. Campbell. Of course that was a consolidated disclosure. So the only thing she gave notice of was seeking medical expenses from her emergency room visit from Mr. Campbell.

So our problem with the medical expenses is we never had any notice of a medical expense theory from the time the complaint was filed. The first time we ever heard anything about neurofeedback -- and this treatment was provided before she filed her complaint. The first time we heard about it was when we got some records that don't refer to us, and we received those four days before discovery closed.

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The first time we received any evidence that showed even Medicare was billed for those services was on March 26th, which was a week after summary judgment argument. So we haven't been able to depose the therapist who provided this treatment. We haven't been able to -- we didn't have any of the expense information at our disposal when discovery was conducted when Ms. Teter was deposed, and it's a paradigm situation for the application of Rule 37. They had the information as early as October, and they didn't disclose it to us. It is prejudicial to us to have to try to defend something by gleaning what information we can outside of the discovery period. So I think that is the main reason why we believe this evidence should not be admitted.

THE COURT: Okay. Any response?

MS. RINI: I would say, Your Honor, that we disclosed -- there's a distinction between the different

records that were disclosed. On one hand, there are the neurotherapy records themselves which are the therapist's notes for Ms. Teter from the year of, you know, about February 2017 through the end of 2017, And then there are Medicare expense records and those are the billing statements from Medicare. And then --

THE COURT: But as to those two components. The first one is what you produced two days before the discovery period ended, and the second group was what you produced months after the discovery period ended. Right?

MS. RINI: That's correct. And we produced the neurotherapy records the day before Ms. Teter's deposition. So the defendant did have an opportunity to cross-examine her about it. Mr. Campbell's counsel did cross-examine her about them for -- I mean there's at least three pages in her deposition about the neurotherapy records. And because they were, you know, tied to seven hours total to depose Ms. Teter they sort of divvied up the responsibilities.

THE COURT: Well but, still, even though it was before the deposition, producing something in the nature of damages, particularly anything related to healthcare treatment two days before the discovery period ends, how is an opposing party supposed to prepare anything, do any followup discovery, other than simply asking the patient?

MS. RINI: Well they didn't ask her anything about the neurotherapy records despite the fact that it's axiomatic that if you go to therapy you're suffering from some sort of anxiety related to something. And we've alleged in our complaint and in all of our pleadings, or in all of our documents during discovery to them, that she suffered anxiety and feared going out into public as a result of their videos. So that would be our argument.

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THE COURT: Well, with regard to this, the fact that the special damages were not pleaded, there was nothing that even mentioned a connection between any of the alleged defamation and any sort of neurofeedback therapy or recovery related to neurofeedback therapy, coupled with the fact that apparently plaintiff's counsel didn't see any connection between the alleged defamation and the neurofeedback therapy so that plaintiff's counsel didn't see it as within the purview of anything that was pleaded, added to the fact that a portion of this was provided two days before the discovery period ended, and the other portion was provided months after the discovery period ended. I believe that just in the interest of fairness, as well as to comply with Rule 9(g), the evidence regarding the neurofeedback therapy, and particularly regarding the bills regarding the neurofeedback therapy, would not come in.

The next one has to do with the YouTube comments. Here's the way I'm looking at the issue of the YouTube comments. The plaintiff is saying that the defamation had this -- the alleged defamation had this impact on her life making her fearful, et cetera. And a portion of that impact is by way of what she's seeing in some of these comments. First of all, that's not a hearsay use. It's showing the comment for the purpose of its effect not for the purpose of its truth.

But I see some real pitfalls to this under 403, in particular. Number one, because we've all looked at comments on the Internet. It doesn't matter what the article is, it seems like by the end of the day there are 1,400 comments; 1,300 of which are completely idiotic. It can become cumulative very quickly. And when they're cherry-picked they can become unduly prejudicial.

So my thought is so long as they are being offered for the limited purpose of showing the impact on the plaintiff that, to a very limited degree, they can come in. I'm not going to allow them, for instance, for the purpose of publication. Because in order to show that as evidence of publication you are going to have to authenticate from whom the comment came. You have to show that it's from a real third person. Now if you have that evidence maybe thick things are a little bit

different from what I understand here. But if it's 1 anything like ordinary comments on the Internet I doubt you have such information. I've kind of told you what my 3 4 first blush reaction is. Do either of you want to say anything to try to move me off of that point? 5 I would, Your Honor, which is, 6 MR. DEAN: 7 candidly, I don't know how to resolve this issue at this moment. But these comments, as you have noted, Your 8 9 Honor, have the potential to be extremely prejudicial 10 considering the language. I assume Your Honor has 11 perused the complaint and seen some of the language

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So Your Honor is admitting them for the limited purpose of showing she read comments and felt trepidation. I think that that is the extent of the information that should be admitted is that Ms. Teter saw comments and they were -- she interpreted them as threatening to her, and that made her feel fearful. Or at the minimum, Your Honor, that before a specific comment is read there must be some type of foundation laid to prove that Ms. Teter read that comment.

that's used. My concern is that that prejudice can't be

fixed once a comment is read, and Ms. Teter has not told

us which of these comments she actually read.

I haven't seen anything in this case that says here are the specific comments that Ms. Teter read. We

asked her about this in her deposition, and I don't believe that she was able to testify about any comment with precision. I know that -- I'm trying to peruse her deposition outline at this second, and I can't do it fast enough. I know she testified in general about what some of the comments said, but she certainly did not use, you know, the language that is used in these comments.

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And she certainly did not say that someone called themselves "Mein Fuhrer" and put a swastika on the comment. So a significant concern for us is just that, in terms of prejudice these comments that have been presented in the complaint, they are not the comments -- I don't think they have ever been represented to be the comments Ms. Teter actually read.

THE COURT: Let me stop you there for a second because, obviously, for it to be -- for a comment to be evidence of the impact upon the plaintiff she's going to have to lay a foundation that she in fact read the comment within the relevant time period. Otherwise, it cannot have an impact. So I don't see what you're arguing about as a potential problem. Because if she can't -- if she can't identify it as what she read then it doesn't come in at all.

MR. DEAN: Right, Your Honor. I guess I'm questioning the procedure by how that happens. For

example, if a document is placed in front of her that says, is this one of the comments you read? Then that's one thing. But if it's -- if plaintiff's counsel has to say the comment out loud and then say, did you read that? Regardless of her answer, the jury's heard it.

THE COURT: Well I certainly hope that plaintiff's counsel knows better than to try to present anything in that manner. Obviously, I'm going on some assumptions here. I assume that these comments are going to be in the form of some sort of exhibit, and that exhibit can be displayed to the witness, who presumably would be Ms. Teter, without being displayed to the jury.

Counsel can ask Ms. Teter, do you see that third comment there, or the third line, on Exhibit 65? You know, yes, I do. Have you seen that before? Yes, I have. Where did you see it? I say it on the Internet when I viewed the video that was about me. How did you see this? Well it's one of the comments that I scrolled down to. Then they offer, you know, can you read that comment to the jury? I mean something along those lines.

Obviously, if counsel jumps out of the box and presents something to the jury that is of documentary form that is not yet in evidence, plaintiff's counsel might expect that I might get rather perturbed. I don't expect plaintiff's counsel is going to do that, at least

I certainly hope not.

2.1

MR. DEAN: Your Honor, I just had one other followup. I also assume that there will be some type of exhibit, but what is the exhibit and who is the witness who can actually say that it is what it purports to be? Because I think copying and pasting comments on to a document is -- suffers from authenticity problems. Unless there's a witness who can say is this -- who can actually sponsor the document and say that these were comments that existed at the time, I think Ms. Teter still has an authenticity problem. And because these comments don't exist as individual snippets, they exist on the web side, it's hard for me to fathom comment number one that Ms. Teter, based on her testimony reading these for a few minutes and stopping, that she read comment one and comment 10,567.

So we don't have that context based on the cutting and pasting that's been provided. So I still think there are significant authenticity concerns just to show that these comments are the comments that actually appear on YouTube.

THE COURT: Well who at the plaintiff's table wants to field this one?

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I think there's an issue beyond Ms. Teter reading the comments. Everybody read

these comments. Lots of people read these comments, and that also led to her damages. People come up to her and say things to her. She has the feeling that everybody hates her from the kind of things that she reads about herself. So it's not just --

THE COURT: That's an evidentiary minefield if there ever was one. I quite purposefully steer away from that particular theory of admissibility because the foundation that you would be stuck having to lay for that seems probably more of a burden than you'd be able to surmount. I would think --

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, the fact that these actually flowed directly from the video -- they were appended to their video on their YouTube. They're not put on a loop mix tape or Heidi Siegler's violin recital. These things -- they were engendered by these people, and the comments refer to Ms. Teter. I think there's a pretty good inference that that's what they're looking for.

THE COURT: I'm looking for a response to the point Mr. Dean was making. And that is, how are you going to be able to show what evidence -- what foundational evidence are you going to be able to present that a particular comment that you want to have her read to the jury was something that Ms. Teter actually saw at

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that time on that website that actually came from there
 1
   within the appropriate timeframe? How do you propose to
 3
   present that?
 4
          MR.
               SASSER: We'll ask her. Ms. Teter, did you
   see these comments? Yes, I remember a couple of them.
 5
   One of them said I should be strangled with my oxygen
 6
 7
          Does it look like the one there in Number 7? Yes.
 8
          THE COURT: Well but you have these in documentary
 9
   form; correct?
10
               SASSER: We do, yes. There may be thousands
          MR.
   of them with regard to video one. And they deal with all
11
   kinds of stuff like Scott Foval and Bob Campbell. Video
12
   two is just about her. It's 300 comments, and I'd say 98
13
14
   percent of them are negative. So there's no question
15
   about them being representative. And they're not that
   long -- that hard to read through unless --
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17
          THE COURT: You're planning to present all of
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   them?
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               SASSER: No, Your Honor, just the ones that
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   she can identify if that's what we're limited to.
21
          THE COURT: Well I want to make sure you
22
   understand what I already said. And that is, you have a
23
   serious 403 problem with regard to presenting a
24
   cumulative amount of commentary because these are
25
   purportedly comments from people who are unidentified.
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You cannot authenticate them as statements of any particular individual. For that matter, you don't know that they came from an individual. You don't know that they came -- you know, supposedly Ms. Teter would be able to testify that she didn't post them. Other than that, you have not eliminated the rest of the world as being the source of these comments.

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Therefore, the only 401 relevance that I see is with regard to the impact that it has on her. Therefore, I would only allow in for her to say there were some comments that made me fearful. You know, Ms. Teter, I show you Exhibit 65, The third line. Can you read that silently? You know, yes. Is that one of the comments that you saw that you're talking about? Yes, it is. When did you see it? You know, the day after the video was posted. Can you read it to the jury? And you do that for maybe three comments or so to give the jury a flavor of what she encountered. If you're going to present 298 of these to the jury you're not going to get anywhere near 298.

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Because that -- I mean, at that point it is so 403 overboard on something that is -- I don't want to say that it's collateral to the suit, but it's

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one small slice of the suit. And you don't want to spend
 1
   hours going through comment after comment.
          MR.
               SASSER: Yes, sir. I understand.
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 4
          THE COURT: Okay? We've been at this about two
   hours and 20 minutes. We still have several motions in
 5
    limine to go through. I guess we'll go ahead and take a
 6
 7
    short break this morning, and then we'll come back and
    wrap up, and we'll get out of here before lunch.
 8
 9
          Marshal, ten minutes please.
                     (Off the record at 11:13 a.m.)
10
11
                     (On the record at 11:26 a.m.)
                       The next motion in limine that I have
12
          THE COURT:
13
   pertains to the transcript that was apparently prepared
14
   regarding the raw video of Mr.
                                    Foval.
15
               Dean, I'll turn to you because here is why I
   don't understand your motion. In criminal trials I deal
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17
   with this all the time. I mean it's almost rote because
18
    it is so common for the prosecution to be presenting a
19
   wiretap, or even a video, of the defendant doing
20
    something wrong. But a lot of times the sound quality
21
    isn't that good so the prosecution always wants to have
22
    that transcript that is simultaneously shown to the jury
    while they're watching the video or listening to the
23
   wiretap.
24
25
          I give this almost rote instruction of, ladies and
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gentlemen of the jury, you are going to be presented with this video by the prosecution. At the same time, you are going to be presented with what purports to be a transcript of what is being said by the parties that you will see in the video. It is my instruction to you that the transcript is not the evidence. The video is the evidence. If you discern that there is any discrepancy between the transcript and the video you shall disregard the transcript, and the video shall govern. I mean that may not be verbatim of what I've said, but I've probably said that a hundred times.

Isn't that exactly what we do here? It's in an unusual context, but isn't that exactly what we do here?

MR. DEAN: No, Your Honor, for a few reasons.

One, we're using the word "transcript." And I don't know what Your Honor receives in the criminal on the text, but this is not a certified by anyone type of document. This is -- I don't know if they use a court reporting service or what type of transcriptionist service was used to prepare it, but this is just a document where one person sat down and purported to listen to it and write down --

THE COURT: That's all I'm talking about in the other context. It's some clerical employee at the U.S. attorney's office that sat down and tried -- or more often at the DEA office that sat down and tried to figure

out what the party said.

MR. DEAN: In this context, Your Honor, both sides agree that there are inaccuracies in the transcript and phrases that can't be heard. Looking at the transcript on its face to a jury is going to be confusing because it has no names, it says SP name, SP two, SP three. It doesn't stay Scott Foval or Hartsock or Campbell.

And what we're talking about here is I think this, from many criminal cases, the exact words are actually the dispositive thing. It's not about, you know, sort of what other conduct was going on or the general import, but exact words really matter in r this case, and the audio was clear but the transcript isn't. And in what I think is --

THE COURT: I don't understand what that means.

If the audio is clear and the transcript isn't, what's the purpose of the transcript?

MR. DEAN: Exactly, Your Honor. I agree a hundred percent. The transcript is unnecessarily confusing things for the jury when we can play the video and they can hear it for themselves. I think where this really becomes an issue is we saw in depositions, and you will see when you have to go through the deposition designations, questions of this form. Well did

Mr. Foval say X in the transcript? Did Mr. Foval say Y in the transcript?

THE COURT: Again, just like the cautionary

instruction that I referred to earlier, the transcript is not evidence. Therefore, if a witness is asked, whether it's on the stand or in canned testimony, what did

Mr. Foval say in the transcript, that's not admissible.

MR. DEAN: Your Honor, I agree with you a hundred percent. That's all I can say on that. I think that that is the very use that we are concerned about. We are concerned about a witness saying well I don't see something in the transcript and the jury making inference, well, then it wasn't said, when that's not a supportable -- that's not a proper conclusion because the recording itself is there.

THE COURT: Can you give me a particular example of where that happens? And it doesn't need to be exact, but just give me an example of how this comes up in the case.

MR. DEAN: Right. Well Mr. Foval -- I don't have the page and line in front of me; Mr. Montecalvo may be able to show it to you. He was asked about what was said. And he was looking at the -- you know, his testimony was done exactly like this Your Honor. The transcript was placed in front of him so he could follow

along, and he was shown video clips. And he frequently said well that's not what the transcript says here. This is wrong. What I actually said is X, so that is wrong.

Or with Mr. Hartsock they were -- you know, questions were asked about whether certain words appear in the transcript with reference only to the transcript. With Mr. O'Keefe, questions were asked about whether words appear in the transcript. The same problem happens because we have summaries, you know, basically smaller transcripts which the journalists themselves prepare of the meeting that are just sound bites, bullets.

And questions are asked, well, does this -- does this summary say, you know, Ms. Teter's name? Does it say X, Y, or Z? And all of that testimony is misleading. Because what is relevant is what is actually recorded, and those two things don't align. So we would say any testimony that's based on what is said in the transcript and any argument or inference to the jury that, you know, go back to the jury room and look at his transcript and see if you -- you look for this word is.

THE COURT: Again, they're not going to have the opportunity to go back to the jury room and look at the transcript because it won't come into evidence. It is merely an aid for them to view the video.

And I'd like for you to go back for a moment about

this whole point of how the transcript does not match up to the video. What's the defect in the transcript?

MR. DEAN: Sure. Can Mr. Montecalvo read a portion of Mr. Foval's testimony?

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. MONTECALVO: Your Honor, to answer your question, with the defect, this is how the examination of Scott Foval was done. And this relates to the designations and the objections to the designations so this ruling would be helpful on this issue.

The way Mr. Foval's deposition was done is he was presented with the transcript, and at times he was given snippets of the video. And then it was confusing whether he was referring to the transcripts at times, or whether he was referring to the video. In fact, at one point in the deposition Mr. Dean who was doing the examination and said, are you looking at the transcript? He said no I wasn't, but the video will show his eyes down.

And then on page 96 of his transcript the question would be -- and this is just one example -- did I read his statement or the statement in the transcript correctly? And then he'd say yes, although I don't think I actually said "yes" in that video. In that conversation I don't think I said yes in between when I was acknowledging his previous question. I think I was

1 | nodding and Mm-hmm. I don't think I actually said yes.

THE COURT: But what does the video say.

MR. MONTECALVO: The video will actually demonstrate what he said, whether he was nodding along, when he was nodding along, whether he "Mm-hmm" which court reporters deal with all the time, whether that was a yes or whether that was, according to Mr. Foval, just a nervous tick that he gave. The video is the best demonstration of that. And to have a transcript come in where he's able to testify based on that and adopt it when he wants to and then run from it when he doesn't want to. That's how the Foval deposition proceeded with the transcript, and that's why it was confusing. That's why we filed this motion.

THE COURT: Okay. Who at plaintiff's table is going to field this? Mr. Sasser.

MR. SASSER: I will, Your Honor. I assume in the cases that Your Honor has given those instructions to the jury that those transcripts are offered by the prosecution who's also offering the videotape or the wiretap. Here they are trying to disavow their own transcript. They signed it in their deposition -- in their summary judgment papers. They quoted it at length in their deposition -- summary judgment papers. In Mr. O'Keefe's deposition I asked him questions. He kept

saying I can't answer that without looking at the transcript. Ten times that happened. And at one point

THE COURT: What relevance does that have? What's your point there? Because here, just like I have in all of those cases -- and it comes up so often. If there is a discrepancy between the video and the transcript, the jury is specifically instructed the transcript isn't evidence. Period. It's the video that's the evidence. So if you have all of these questions about, well, what does the transcript say? I don't care who's asking the question. How does that come in.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, the actual -- what they're trying to prove here is what happened in the meeting and not necessarily what's on the tape.

THE COURT: I don't understand what that means. I thought the video is of the back and forth that has been recorded on the video.

MR. SASSER: Right. But anybody can testify as to what happened in a meeting. I was there and this happened. And then somebody can say, yeah, but look at this tape. This tape doesn't show that that's what happened. The actual memory of the people who were there are the best evidence. That's the -- we're not trying to prove --

1 THE COURT: You're saying this transcript isn't a 2 transcript at all; that it's somebody's recollection of 3 what took place? 4 MR. SASSER: No, sir. I'm talking about just witness testimony. 5 THE COURT: Then I don't understand where you're 6 7 going. 8 MR. SASSER: You've got witness testimony, you've 9 got video, and then you've got a transcript. The transcript is of the video. If you were trying to prove 10 11 the contents of the video then the best evidence rule 12 applies. If you're trying to prove what happened in the 13 meeting you can still ask people about what happened in 14 the meeting without necessarily using the video. they --15 16 THE COURT: That doesn't have anything to do with 17 the transcript. I am not understanding your argument at 18 all. Yes, there are circumstances in which the people, 19 the participants in the meeting can testify about what 20 happened at the meeting. Now there might be hearsay 21 problems with what was said, et cetera. But if the 22 question is what is on the video, and there's a 23 transcript, the video is evidence and the transcript is 24 not. 25 MR. SASSER: That's correct, Your Honor. But the

1 transcript was also a statement by a party. It's their 2 transcript. They created it. They relied on it in their 3 depositions for giving testimony. 4 THE COURT: Transcript of the defendants as to what? As to the contents of the video? 5 SASSER: As to what happened. I would ask --6 MR. 7 THE COURT: Again, I'll ask you the same question that I was asking Mr. Dean a few minutes ago. Give me 8 9 an example of where you have a situation where you have a 10 quote, unquote transcript about what happened that is somehow not on the video that the transcript is 11 12 supposedly a transcript of? That makes no sense to me. 13 MR. SASSER: I asked Mr. Foval, was -- I'm 14 sorry. I asked Mr. O'Keefe was Mr. Foval talking about 15 Shirley Teter? Yes, he was. Well did he say her name? 16 I would have to see the transcript. And then we'd trot 17 out the transcript. He looked at it for 13 minutes, 18 without stopping, looking for Shirley Teter's name. Не

think it's evidence that comes in. The witness was using a particular document to bolster his testimony. They quoted it throughout the deposition in their summary judgment papers, Your Honor.

was relying on it. And if he used it to rely on it, I

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THE COURT: What does that have to do with the evidentiary issue?

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          MR.
                        It's a statement by them.
               SASSER:
                                                    It's an
   admission by the party. All admissions by parties are,
 3
   by definition, not hearsay. So they should be -- it
 4
   should come in.
          THE COURT: Well I don't perceive, at least, that
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   the objection is being made based on it being hearsay. I
 6
 7
   understand that the objection is being made as to really
   two grounds. One is authenticity. Because if it
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 9
   purports to be a transcript it has to actually transcribe
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   what was said. But, secondly, under the best evidence
   rule.
          The best evidence of what is shown on a video is
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12
   the video. It's not seen the transcript. I see both of
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   those as being very relevant points.
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          MR.
               SASSER: The videos aren't great, Your Honor.
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   I don't know if you've seen any of them, but they're --
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                      We're talking about the two videos
          THE COURT:
   that are at issue, or we're talking about the stock
17
18
   footage?
19
          MR.
               SASSER:
                         The stock footage.
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          THE COURT: Okay. I have not seen that.
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                SASSER:
                         So it's 2.5 hours.
                                             They're using
22
   hidden cameras shooting through buttonholes, and
23
   sometimes the person who is talking is on the screen;
24
   sometimes you're just looking at the ceiling.
25
                      Just like the videos that the DEA
          THE COURT:
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agents take. That's the thing. This is just what I see 1 all the time, and I never get any argument about this. That's why I feel like there's must be something I'm 3 4 missing here to be hearing these arguments, because it sounds like what at least the prosecutors in the criminal 5 defense bar think is just normal everyday stuff. 6 7 explain to me why it's not. 8 MR. SASSER: Because they're walking away from 9 their transcript. I assume the prosecution puts in both. 10 Right? I assume. These guys want to get away from what they use throughout discovery and now go --11 12 THE COURT: You keep talking about discovery. 13 We're talking about admissibility of evidence. video says today is Thursday, and their transcript says 14 15 today is Wednesday, is that an admission of a party 16 opponent that the video says today is Wednesday? Is it? 17 SASSER: It's an admission of what they said, MR. 18 not of what the video said. 19 THE COURT: But it's a transcript purportedly of 20 the video. Why doesn't the best evidence rule keep that 21 out? 22 SASSER: In that situation, if you're talking MR. 23 about what's in the video, I think the best evidence rule 24 does apply. I do have a case -- we cited a case here that's consistent with what Your Honor was discussing in 25

the criminal context. The Breezy Point case. This says nothing in Rule 1002 prevents introduction of a transcript to aid a jury in following the recording if the original recording is available for the Court's inspection. I don't know when they said it helps the jury. I don't know if that means admissible or they just see it at the time.

THE COURT: Right. And that's exactly the way it's always done. It is allowed to be shown to the jury, but the jury is specifically instructed the transcript isn't evidence because of the best evidence rule. It's merely an aid to the jury in viewing the video.

MR. SASSER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. STREZA: Judge, if I could just answer or respond to one thing that Mr. Montecalvo said. I took the deposition of Mr. Foval, and that transcript was used predominantly in the way that you have described it to be used. It was used to help him understand inaudible testimony he was giving or statements he was giving as well as the interviewers were giving in that situation.

THE COURT: Give me an example of what you're talking about. In other words, the video is inaudible and you can't hear what was said, but then when asked about it Mr. Foval said what?

MR. STREZA: The transcript reflects what I was

trying to say, Your Honor. Or he would say the 1 transcript says what you cannot hear. So that would 3 refresh his recollection as to what happened in the 4 video. I can't give you an exact --THE COURT: Is it in terms of the refreshed 5 recollection? 6 7 MR. STREZA: Yes. 8 THE COURT: In other words, Mr. Foval you see 9 this part of the video. Can you hear what was being said? No, I can't, it's inaudible. 10 11 STREZA: Does the transcript help you in any MR. 12 way? And he would say yes it does. 13 THE COURT: Will it help you in any way, or did 14 you ask does it refresh your recollection? 15 STREZA: Yes, Your Honor. MR. 16 THE COURT: What was said? Before you refresh his 17 recollection there do you ask him, do you remember what 18 was said? 19 MR. STREZA: I believe that's the case, Your 20 Honor. I can't give you the line or the page at this 21 time. 22 THE COURT: You either go through the paces or it doesn't come in. You know how this works. 23 24 MR. STREZA: Gotcha. I didn't want the Court to

leave today thinking the use of the transcript at the

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deposition was entirely inappropriate and it was not.

THE COURT: You know, apparently, I'm going to have to -- you're going to make me read this 1,700 pages, aren't you, to where I'm going to have to go through item by item. Basically speaking, that transcript is going to be a very limited use. I've told you the general limited use which is going to be allowed. But beyond that there is a significant foundation that has to be laid, and that's part of what Mr. Streza has been talking about here.

If there is a portion of the video that is inaudible, and then there is a transcript that is prepared by someone who was there that says well you can't hear it on the tape but what he said was X, then, you know, there is that narrow exception to where it may be substantive evidence there. But I mean that -- it's going to be hard to pass that camel through the eye of that needle.

Mr. Dean.

MR. DEAN: A couple questions. One, I would -just to be clear, this transcript was not prepared by one
of the journalists. It was prepared by a third party.
So I'm not sure where it's an a situation where the video
was ininaudible and the transcript is more complete that
I think would be anomalous. So to understand what your

instruction is Your Honor. I understand you to say that 1 the transcript itself does not get submitted as evidence 3 to the jury, and that if a witness is being asked 4 questions based on the transcript that that also is inadmissible. I think those were our fundamental 5 6 questions. 7 THE COURT: Without any further foundation, that is correct. 8 9 MR. DEAN: Thank you. 10 THE COURT: The foundational exception would be 11 that very narrow exception that Mr. Streza was just

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I completely forgot to address Rule 1007 which says that if it's a statement -- a written statement of party it may be used to show the contents of the recording.

THE COURT: It says what?

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addressing.

MR. SASSER: A proponent may prove the content of a recording by the written statement of a party against whom the evidence is offered. We're offering it against Veritas. And I think this is a statement by Veritas since it's -- they're the ones who had it prepared.

THE COURT: Well and again this is going back to the very narrow exception that Mr. Streza was just talking about, unless I'm misunderstanding your argument.

First of all, the best evidence rule says it's the recording that is the evidence. So if the recording says Thursday, you can't refute that by some other evidence.

However, if the recording is inaudible and the defendant's statement of what was said was Wednesday, then you can use that so long as you've laid that foundation. That's 1007. You can use it as substantive evidence under those circumstances but you cannot use the writing to in fact refute what is in the best evidence.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I think both parties have addressed Rule 1007. I would just urge the Court to look at it and see to the extent to which it is an exception to Rule 1002. It seems to me that testimony or statement by a party may be used against it, and it says the original doesn't even need to be accounted for.

THE COURT: Well you say doesn't need to be accounted for. That's different from the fact that it contradicts it. Under the best evidence rule you cannot contradict the best evidence. I mean the circumstance in which that might come up more often is if there is, you know, the document, the lease, or whatever, that is at issue, and one of the parties has his notes as to what the lease contains. And you say well the lease may say this it's for one year but the defendant's notes say that it was for three years. Does that change the terms of

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Of course not. If you can't find the lease
 1
   the lease?
   and you're suing on the lease, and the defendant's notes
 3
    to the extent that they might otherwise be admissible say
 4
   it's a three year lease, that's then substantive evidence
   usable against the defendant that it's a three year
 5
    lease.
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               SASSER:
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          MR.
                         Okay.
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          THE COURT: I feel like I must be missing
 9
    something because, to me, it seems so simple, and you
10
    seem very whetted to the idea that it's more usable than
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    I think it is.
12
          MR.
               SASSER:
                         I was just looking at the actual
13
    language of 1002 and 1007, and there's nothing in there
14
   about contradict contradicting the other. Your Honor,
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    the example Your Honor was giving kind of is a corporate
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    example. When there is a -- when you come to a contract
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   all the other stuff is excluded and I keep trying to
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    think of the term.
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          THE COURT: Parole evidence rule.
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               SASSER: Parole evidence rule. Yes, sir,
          MR.
21
    Your Honor.
22
          THE COURT: Yeah. If you don't have the document.
                        There's another term that the
2.3
          MR.
               SASSER:
24
   parties use when -- at the end of the contract with stuff
25
    about using North Carolina law that -- there's a term
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that everything that's in the contract itself is subsumed from all of the negotiation.

where I stand on this one. It can be can be shown to the jury in conjunction with the showing of the video. If there is any point at which the video is inaudible then the transcript can be offered as substantive evidence only as to the inaudible part against the defendant if you lay a foundation that the defendant in fact prepared it.

The next item I have here is with regard to the Foval deposition. It seems like there were various things here including what we were just talking about a moment ago. Just looking at my notes, if I'm understanding the question here correctly, it has to do with where Mr. Foval is shown a portion of the video and then is asked, well what did you mean? Is that a fair rendition of what the question is at least?

MR. MONTECALVO: That's correct, Your Honor.

That takes what we were just arguing one step further is that he was then asked not what's on the video. He's then asked, what did you mean? What did you say? And I have various examples that I looked at from the transcript. The way the deposition flowed was that Mr. Foval was asked questions setting up the meeting

that led to the video, all appropriate. Who were you meeting with that day? What were you wearing? What was the other side wearing? That's admissible.

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What the motion in limine relates to is where Mr. Foval is getting into what he meant by those words. Sometimes what the people he was talking about that he was talking with, the journalists, meant when they were asked him the questions he was asked. Once they set up the meeting in the deposition they started asking Mr. Foval questions about what was said.

The questions are, what were you referring to?

And his answers at some points would be I was explaining.

Question, would be what did you state? One question was,
what did Mr. O'Keefe state? These are all relating to
the video.

THE COURT: I'm not understanding the context here. Is he being asked what is shown on the video, or is he being asked what is your recollection of what took place in this meeting without reference to the video?

MR. MONTECALVO: No. He would be shown the actual clip of a video. So Mr. Streza would show

Mr. Foval a portion of the video and say, okay, we've now listen today that video. What did you say on that video? And at times it bleeds into the last argument:

What does it say on the transcript?

THE COURT: Well I mean -- I need to understand your -- the point that you're raising here. Is it that Mr. Foval is now changing what he said? In other words, on the recording he says it's Thursday, and Mr. Streza asks him so what did you say on the recording? And he says well I said it was Wednesday. Is that the sort of thing that we're talking about? That he's changing the content of the video?

MR. MONTECALVO: That's precisely it. There's portions where he was changing what he said based on what

portions where he was changing what he said based on what was on the video. Many of our designations, and our objections to the designation in the Foval transcript, relate to that line of questioning where he's shown the video and then he's asked then to interpret what it was he said what it was he meant and, you know, did you say that? We think that that's the jury domain is that, as Your Honor said early in this pretrial, you have the video. You have the video. They have the video and we presented the video. There are -- it's a long video, but that video is the best evidence of what's there. And for Mr. Foval then to be able to contradict and state what he real really intended to say as opposed to what he actually said is not probative of any issue in the case.

THE COURT: Well that gets into a totally different issue, doesn't it?

MR. MONTECALVO: That was also the basis of our motion in limine too. To the extent that there's some benefit to Mr. Foval then having a catharsis of what he wanted to say in that meeting, or what he really -- how the other side should have interpreted it instead. He's now allowed to just explain the video for the first time what it was that he meant.

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Questions would be asked: How did you respond?

What did he ask? Those are the types of questions that
the video is going to be very clearly showing what he -how he responded and what he asked, and it would be
cumulative. It certainly would be a waste of time. And
in this case, for the Foval transcript, it would reduce
out a large portion of how that questioning went.

THE COURT: Do I understand correctly that the Foval deposition that we're talking about was the de bene esse deposition on video for the purposes of preserving it for trial?

MR. MONTECALVO: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we have this juxtaposition of the video clips, and then Mr. Foval either explaining what he said or modifying what he said. Is that --

MR. MONTECALVO: That's correct. And that's why these designations are particularly important.

THE COURT: Okay. Well let me hear from the

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   plaintiff's side.
               SASSER: Your Honor, their very defense to
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   this lawsuit is we thought he was talking about Shirley
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   Teter. We understood he was talking about Shirley Teter.
   I think Mr. Foval is entitled to say whether or not he
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   was talking about Shirley.
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          THE COURT: What relevancy does that have?
          MR.
               SASSER: Whether he was talking about Shirley
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   Teter or not.
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          THE COURT: What he meant not what he said.
                                                        What
              What relevance does it have?
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   he meant.
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               SASSER: Who he was talking about was
          MR.
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   somebody other than Shirley Teter; I think that's
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   relevant. If he says --
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          THE COURT: I asked you what relevance does it
   have, and your answer of "I think it's relevant" doesn't
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17
   really answer my question.
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          MR.
               SASSER: Who he was talking about is relevant
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   if it's not Shirley Teter.
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          THE COURT: How? What's the relevance of it?
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   What element of your case does that go to? And let me
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   refine my question because I seemed not to be
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   communicating it very clearly here. You have person A,
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   Foval, communicating to reporter and he says A, B and C.
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   Reporter says, wow, I've got a story. He said A, B and
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- C. And reporter then goes and writes a story based on A,
  B and C. Foval comes back later and said well I didn't
  really mean A, B and C. I meant X, Y and Z. What
  relevance does that have to what that reporter wrote?
  The reporter wrote Foval said A, B and C.
  - $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  SASSER: Here the reporter took M, V and A and put it in that order involving things that were not even at that conversation.

- THE COURT: Okay. And that may be part of what your claim is based on. But for Foval then to go and say, by the way, all the things I didn't say are these. How is that relevant to the claim of whether or not the product that was provided, the final document, the video, is in some way defamatory.
- MR. SASSER: What Foval was going to be saying is, okay, when I'm wearing the checked shirt I wasn't even talking to Brittney Rivera. That was several months earlier. I certainly could not have been talking about Shirley Teter because nobody in the world knew who she was until she got hit at the Trump rally. He can say these are three different videos and these got jumbled together. And he can also say what were the circumstances under which he was asked the question because they cut stuff. He can say look --

25 THE COURT: So there are pieces missing from the

1 video. SASSER: From video one and video two, Your MR. 3 Honor. 4 THE COURT: I'm talking about the video that's being shown to Mr. Foval in his deposition. 5 SASSER: I think some pieces of that may be 6 MR. 7 Bernie testified that in his deposition missing. Mr. 8 that video was disclosed to us half a month after 9 discovery closed. Because what they had given us was of such poor quality it came in 15-, 20-second snippets. 10 11 This was the one that I think thing nobody really got to consider here during the discovery period itself. That's 12 13 why we were relying on the transcript. So Mr. Foval can 14 say --15 THE COURT: Again you have me confused. I thought the Foval de bene esse deposition was taken here just 16 17 within the last few weeks. 18 MR. SASSER: Yes, it was, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: So what does that have to do with what 20 you had months earlier or even after the close of 21 discovery? I don't understand. Your comment made no 2.2 sense to me. 2.3 MR. SASSER: Okay. What Mr. Foval is talking 24 about is about -- he was also shown video one and video two and was asked, what was going on there? Were you 25

allowed to -- is this your entire sentence? No. And then you go back to the video that they're talking about that they produced in December, and he was able to say, see, I was asked and this is my whole answer. And over here on video one they cut that part out. I think that's pretty important for the jury to be able to understand.

THE COURT: Again, I feel like we're talking in two different universes here. For Mr. Foval to be shown a snippet of a video and then asked is that all of what you said and he says no, they cut off the second half of that sentence, and then a video is shown of the entire sentence. I think that's admissible.

I think it might be going around your elbow to get to your nose, but it -- the ultimate point is that the actual statement by Foval was truncated for whatever reason.

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I can see how that might be relevant to the issue of defamation. But for Foval to say, yeah, it says Thursday on the video but I really said Wednesday, that -- that doesn't come in.

MR. SASSER: Let me make this clear. I do not want to do that. I do not want him to contradict what he said, and we're not offering it for that. We're offering him -- I would like to be able to ask -- explain the part

where he says, were you -- did you mention the words
"Shirley Teter?" And he says no. If I misunderstand the
defendants, they want to show the 2.5 hours of video so
that the jury can determine whether he said the words
"Shirley Teter" or not. I'd like to be able to just cut
to the chase on that and have him say I did not say
"Shirley Teter." We've probably got two or three clips
of him saying that in his deposition.

THE COURT: That falls into the category of not so much the rules of evidence but sort of the manner in which trials are ordinarily conducted.

MR. SASSER: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: If the defendants want to be utterly obstreperous I can see where they might say, no, we're going to have to play that whole 2.5 hours. But I don't know too many lawyers who would make that objection because it's just going to tick off the jury.

MR. SASSER: There's another issue not talking about what he meant but why he said certain things. Why did you say uh-huh when you were asked this? And he.

THE COURT: That's an explanation as well. That goes outside of the scope of what he said on the video.

Again, it's outside of the scope of what he communicated to the reporter. How is that relevant?

MR. SASSER: It's relevant in that he -- they did

not get the names out -- get from him what they were trying to get him to accomplish. They were trying to get him to say words like "violence," and "Shirley Teter," and they succeeded on one but they did not succeed on the other. And it goes down to whether it's an issue of truth. Was it true that they were talking about Shirley Teter? If they're --

THE COURT: Again, I understood that point. But where he said on the video -- said as part of the discussion with the reporter A, B and C, and then he's asked in the deposition well what did you mean? And then he testifies in substance I didn't tell the reporter X, Y and Z but that's what I was thinking. I don't see where that has any relevance because that's something that was not communicated to the reporter. It cannot be part of that reporter's formulation of a statement which you are now claiming is defamatory. It is outside of that box.

MR. SASSER: Well physical -- if the jury is shown video one that makes it sound like he is talking about Shirley Teter being one of his activists, and they say we understood that and we're able to have Mr. Foval say no that was half of a sentence and, oh, by the way, they did not put in the sentence where I said we never paid anybody go get beaten up. That goes to their recklessness in taking certain of his things out of the

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   video when they created video one.
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          THE COURT: Again, that's a totally different
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    situation from what you were describing a moment ago
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   where he is saying I told them A, B and C, and they put
    that in the video. I also told them D, and here it is on
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    the video clip. I mean that's part of what was
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    communicated to the reporter. Therefore it goes to the
    issue of whether or not it goes to the defamatory
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   editing.
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          MR.
                SASSER:
                         That's what it goes to the recorder.
          THE COURT: Have I given you all enough guidance
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    to what I'm going to let in and what I won't?
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          MR.
                SASSER: As I understand it, you're not going
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    to let him say what he meant. You're going to let him
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    say what was said and what was not said what went in the
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    video one, and that was -- or what did not go into video
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    one that he had actually said, and what had got cut out.
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          THE COURT:
                       I'm not going to let him say what he
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   meant, and I'm not going to let him say what is at
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   variance from what it shows on the video what he said.
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          MR.
                SASSER:
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MONTECALVO: Your Honor, if I could be heard
          MR.
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   on that point lastly? /
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          THE COURT: Just a second. You may.
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          MR.
               MONTECALVO: Thank you. Your Honor, I think
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there might be some efficiency to discuss this issue just a little bit further. Part of the issue we have with the way Mr. Foval's deposition was conducted, with snippets from the raw video, is I think going to be one of the challenges that we also have at trial. As Mr. Sasser mentioned, we have two hours of that raw video. The defendants don't desire to play all two hours of that video.

However, if the defendants are going to be accused of selectively editing and defamatory editing, then there does need to be significant context around the statements when a witness is asked questions at trial, which is essentially what the Foval deposition said, when the witness is asked questions about it doesn't say anything in there about this does it? And there may be something 30 minutes before, 30 minutes after, that does -- I think the completeness doctrine would allow us to put in without trying to be obstreperous about that put in the entire video. We don't desire to do that. And I think that we can reach some type of reasonable accommodation with the plaintiff so that --

THE COURT: I mean that's all an issue of trial tactics. That's not an issue of evidentiary admissibility. Go ahead.

MR. MONTECALVO: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. MONTECALVO: I think what we're going to see in the designations from Foval is there may be some designations being done by the plaintiff based on what I understand Your Honor's ruling to be. But where -- we have issues with how they picked the snippets from the raw video they picked. So, in other words, the video is two hours long. They have picked a snippet to ask

Mr. Foval about for a minute or two, and he's asked questions about that. That's not going to be appropriate for trial to show the completeness and to show that answer. I think we would have an opportunity to present the context around that video. That's going to be very difficult to do in trial if we make that objection, and if Your Honor sustains it, that we're allowed to play some of that at that time if we haven't worked --

THE COURT: Why at that time?

MR. MONTECALVO: Well I think that's -- that's what the -- that's my understanding of how that would work is that if they're going to play a portion or read a portion of a transcript, in the sake of completeness they would need to read the rest of it at that time.

THE COURT: Maybe I'm not understanding what you have in mind.

MR. MONTECALVO: Well I think --

THE COURT: Here is kind of how I was envisioning where you were going with this. That a 15-second clip of the video, the raw footage, is played to Mr. Foval, and then he's asked: You didn't say anything about the time square bombing, did you? He says, no, I didn't say anything at all. But, in reality, 30 minutes later in the raw footage, he did talk about the time times square bombing.

Are you saying that rather than presenting some sort of rebuttal or defense evidence that says, you know, that puts into evidence that portion of the raw footage that completely undermines what Mr. Foval said, you want to with be able to put it in as part of his testimony?

MR. MONTECALVO: I believe at that time that they're obligated to provide it at that time so it's not a confusing answer and that the answer is complete at that point.

THE COURT: Why didn't you cross-examine him about it?

MR. MONTECALVO: We didn't have the snippets ahead of time. And we did cross-examine him about part of it. But it's not something you're able to do in a deposition on the fly; and it's an objection that I think we preserved.

THE COURT: I mean how would you have done it at

trial to say right then we think -- you want to be able to play a much broader snippet?

MR. MONTECALVO: I think if -- that's correct.

THE COURT: Even if it's a snippet that's 30 minutes later in the video?

MR. MONTECALVO: I think that's correct, Your Honor. If it's 30 minutes later then we would be able to play up until that point. But this was a de bene esse deposition and, as such, we would have had that advanced knowledge of what was going to be played and we would have been able to make that. Because it was still in deposition format we preserved that as an objection that, you know, as to how he was asked questions on those snippets.

THE COURT: Well I'll take a look at those issues in the transcript. Generally speaking, where it's the next sentence then, yes, the rule of completeness says you need to show him a little bit more. Where it's 30 minutes later you don't get to interrupt the flow of a direct examination by saying, well, let's listen to the next 30 minutes of this video to see if that's correct. I've never seen anybody want to do that sort of thing because, again, part of this is trial tactics. But you don't want to tick off the jury, and you sure don't want to put them to sleep.

You save that for cross- examination, and on cross-examination you say, now, Mr. Foval, on direct examination you said that you didn't say anything about the Times Square bombing. That's what you said, isn't Yes, that's what I said. Well let me show you it? Oh. part of this video right here. You play the video and say, Mr. Foval, what you said before wasn't true, was I mean that's how you do it; right? MR. MONTECALVO: Except Mr. Foval is not going to be at trial. THE COURT: Well that's the problem with the de bene esse deposition. When you've got it in the can, you've got it in the can. You have other ways you can do it. You can put it on through a different witness who can explain something about what's in the raw footage. There are other ways to do it. But you kind of have one opportunity to do it, and you missed that opportunity. That doesn't mean that you're out of luck. MR. MONTECALVO: Thank you, Your Honor. SASSER: Your Honor, I just want to make sure MR. that this ruling applies to everybody in that conversation. If they bring in their people to say what they meant in the conversation or what they understood they're still bound by the words of the transcript and

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they can't come in and do anything that Mr.

THE COURT: I'm not understanding the context in which you're asking this question.

MR. SASSER: There were three people in that conversation on September 15th 2016: Mr. Foval, Christian Hartsock, and Brittney Rivera, two of their employees, the people who take everything down. I want to make sure Your Honor's ruling with regard to what Scott Foval said, or can be allowed to be played on his deposition, is going to be consistent with what they were going to be allowed to say in front of the jury.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, again, keep in mind, the rules that you're wanting to apply here are also supposed to be the same rules that apply to the New York Times and CBS and MSNBC and Fox News. So when you're talking about the reporters here, when they are taking this raw information, just like the reporter from the New York Times interviewing some cabinet member and then taking from that cabinet member and writing down what they believe to be the reasonable inferences from what was said. That's relevant to whether or not what they write is defamatory.

So there are two components here in the creation of the product. One is what is communicated. Secondly is what is the reasonable inference from that communication. The speaker's reasonable inference or

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what the speaker believes the hearer should have drawn as
 1
   a reasonable inference is irrelevant to that process.
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   The reporter's inference that is drawn in the preparation
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   of the product could potentially be very relevant.
          So, I mean, we're talking about two different ends
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   of that communication chain. It seems to me like you're
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    saying well the same rule applies at both ends, doesn't
        Well, no, it doesn't. It's two totally different
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   things at least in the context of an allegedly defamatory
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   product. Does that make sense? Have I said that in a
   way that makes sense.
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                SASSER: I understand what Your Honor says.
          MR.
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    I'm just wondering to what extent Mr. Hartsock is going
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   to be able to say. You know, he said that and I thought
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    this and, you know, what is the relevance of what he
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    thought?
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          THE COURT: Well with no more context than that, I
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   don't know that it has any relevance.
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          MR.
               SASSER: Thank you, your Honor.
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                       If he says I drew a reasonable
          THE COURT:
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    inference from the specifics of what Mr. Foval said, and
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    that's what I put into the individual video, then it
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   might be very relevant.
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          THE COURT: Do we need to do anything else with
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regard to the Foval deposition?

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1 MR. MONTECALVO: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: The next thing I had was with regard to journalistic standards. Here's the question I have.

I don't know who is fielding this question on the plaintiff's side. As I understand it, unless we get into an actual malice standard it is a negligence standard.

This isn't like a medical malpractice case where you put on evidence about the standard of care for an orthopedist. It is a reasonable man standard; the way that an ordinary person would act under the circumstances. And if there is a breach of that ordinary person standard then there is potential liability.

With that in mind, what is the relevance of some exterior standard, some exterior source? I mean I could see where it is in a professional malpractice case but this isn't a professional malpractice case.

MS. RINI: Your Honor, we would agree that this is not a professional malpractice case. However, defendants have argued that they are journalists and they act as though they abide by journalistic rules, and for that reason it would be important to show that they do not follow those rules.

THE COURT: Well you say it would be important to show that. What is the relevance? Tie it to one of the elements of what you have to prove as to your case in

chief.

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MS. RINI: To show negligence you have to show that a reasonable person, in the same situation or similarly situated to the defendants, would not have done what they did. I think that it would be relevant to show what a journalist or someone -- I'm not saying that we -- we do not agree that defendants are journalists but persons --

THE COURT: Well but and I gathered that from what you have written here, and that's the source of my question. It seems to me from what you've written that you want to have it both ways. That you want to say well they're not journalists but they should be held to the standard of journalists because they're negligent if they're not held to the standard of what they're not. Explain to me how that makes any sense.

MS. RINI: I guess if the Court were to determine that they were journalists then evidence of journalistic norms would be relevant. If the Court were to determine that they were not journalists, journalistic norms would inform the jury on what typically happens when you publish news articles.

THE COURT: Well don't you have to present evidence as a foundation for the presentation of this evidence? In other words, don't you have to prove that

they are in fact journalists in order to get into 1 evidence journalistic standards? And if you put on evidence that they're not in fact journalists then how do 3 4 you get it in? I guess you're right, Your Honor. 5 don't think we'll be introducing evidence that they are 6 7 journalists. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So then what's going to happen with this evidence about the standards? 9 10 MS. RINI: It's only in the event that they say that they are journalists because they will be testifying 11 12 that they're journalists. 13 THE COURT: I can see where this might be some cross-examination material. 14 15 MS. In that case we would want to RINI: introduce evidence of journalistic norms, and for that 16 17 reason it would be relevant. 18 THE COURT: Well, again, you say introduce 19 evidence of. I was saying cross-examination of them 20 which is not to split too fine a hair there. But I can 21 see where if they hold themselves out as journalists that 22 you might want to impeach them as journalists. 2.3 RINI: Correct, Your Honor. MS. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Dean, Mr. Montecalvo, do you want

to respond to that at all?

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MR. MONTECALVO: To that point, I think Your Honor has that one. It's just a matter of how this came in and the way it came in and about whether the defendants were journalists or not was on direct examination asking the defendant representatives and the defendants questions about whether they were journalists, and how did they consider themselves journalists when they do X. And I think based on what Your Honor is inclined that none of that is going to come in on that direct testimony.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MONTECALVO: Thank you.

THE COURT: The next one that we have here is the evidence of malice or recklessness. Let me turn here to Mr. Dean or Mr. Montecalvo. It seems that the plaintiff's claim here is based in part on malice -- an assertion of malice. So why shouldn't that be relevant? Or have I misunderstood your motion.

MR. MONTECALVO: Your Honor, you are correct that the malice -- the analysis on malice is going to come in to this case. Whether it's per quod or whether it's per se, it's not that we're trying to exclude evidence relating to malice. What we're trying to exclude with this motion is specific types of evidence relating to the way that we expect that the plaintiff is going to attempt

to prove malice, and those are set out in the bullets on
Page 18 and 19 of the motion. Each one of these issues
comes from the Fourth Circuit decision stating, as such,
that profit motivating the ill-will towards Ms. Teter.

None of these things should come in in this way under the
guise that they're trying to prove malice.

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For example, the first one is insensitivity to the plaintiff's reputation or career. The question was asked of the defendants, was this fair to Ms. Teter? And based on that they're going to say that the defendants didn't care that Ms. Teter was going to be potentially defamed as a result of this, and they're using that as a back door way to prove malice in much the same way.

THE COURT: I'm not understanding what you mean by a back door way of proving malice. Because that sounds like sort of a front door way of avenue.

MR. MONTECALVO: That's a front door way. That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Malice is an element of the claim they're making, both with regard to liability and potentially with regard to punitives. So why wouldn't that come in?

MR. MONTECALVO: Well just that specific about how it was fair to Ms. Teter and is something that was covered in *Reuber*. In that decision, there was

specifically that ill-will toward the plaintiff is not a relevant factor into the malice standard under the Fourth Circuit law.

THE COURT: Well but there -- and remind me if I'm getting this wrong. There wasn't it seeking to elicit testimony specifically about that? You know, isn't it true that you hated the plaintiff? That sort of questioning. Whereas, here the particular things you're talking about are, isn't it true that you hated

Ms. Teter? It was questions about well, you know, isn't it true that you put this together in a way that you didn't care whether this hurt her or not? And why isn't that malice?

MR. MONTECALVO: Well I think that's -- it's the insensitivity. And that's what the Reuber case states is that nor can Cooper's alleged insensitivity to Reuber's career or reputation be the basis for recovery. And there's limits to the lengths to which news organizations can be expected to go to in protecting the sensibilities of one side in the public debate. So this relates to the malice standard and, I think, regardless of whether

Ms. Teter is a public figure or a limited purpose public figure. It's that example.

The profit motive was another example of ways to prove malice that were viewable that's not authorized.

In this case the defendants were asked how much they made as a result of the videos. The suggestion being that because -- that they chose to defame in order to have a profit motive, to have a story that was going to be interesting and that was going to be read. And Reuber states precisely the opposite, and that if you can't -- it's very typical that news organizations are going to publish stories that are going to be profit-based and that that should not be a standard.

THE COURT: Again, just like I was talking about with regard to one of the earlier matters. You have to keep in mind that we're talking about the same body of law that applies to the New York Times, and CBS, and MSNBC, and Fox News. Can you imagine a defamation claim against the New York Times where the representative of the New York Times is asked, well, do you make a profit by publishing your paper? Well of course they -- well I don't know. Maybe the New York Times -- it's a newspaper, and it probably doesn't make a profit anymore but they try to.

Their objective is to make a profit. Does that show malice? It's irrelevant to malice. It is not the least bit probative of the question of malice. And it seems to me as you go down this list -- it's been a while since I read *Reuber*, but it seems to me that on this list

there are some things that are just not probative at all. 1 But there are other things that might be probative of malice, if taken with other evidence, that the cumulative 3 4 effect would be a showing of malice and, you know, insensitivity to the plaintiff may be part of that. 5 You know, even with a special purpose public 6 7 figure -- I'm not saying that Ms. Teter is. But even if she is, as a purveyor of information, is simple 8 9 insensitivity to her reputation taken by itself enough to 10 prove malice? I think anybody with common sense would say no. But when you take that element which has that 11 12 nugget of 401 relevance and you put it with a lot of 13 other things it might have a tendency to cumulatively 14 prove malice. It's that -- it's the same old 401 15 standard. If there is that nugget of probative value 16 then it comes in unless it gets kicked out under 403. 17 It's awfully hard for me to rule on a motion in limine 18 with regard to these because it has to do with the 19 context of the evidence as a whole. 20 MONTECALVO: Your Honor, I think you're MR. 21 sensitive to the issues that are going to be raised at 22 trial, and that's precisely the purpose of that motion in 23 limine. Thank you. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Sasser, do you have anything you 25 want to say on that point?

MR. SASSER: Yes, I do, Your Honor. The Reuber case came out of the district of Maryland. It did therefore not involve the North Carolina punitive damages statute which goes through and categorizes a whole bunch of things that are relevant to whether something constitutes punitive damages. One of them is profit. The very --

THE COURT: That has nothing to do with malice.

MR. SASSER: It has nothing to do with malice.

THE COURT: That's what their motion in limine is about is the question of whether or not profit motive is probative of malice. The answer is no. Does that mean that profit motive or actual profit realized might be an element of a claim for punitive damages is a completely different question which I do not understand has been presented to me.

MR. SASSER: I believe there's a rule, but I can't remember the number of it, that says if a evidence is admissible for any purpose then it comes in and the court does with it as is appropriate. This evidence will come in for punitive damages. The very things they're saying that are covered by the Reuber case that aren't malice, they're punitive damages. It's explicitly listed by the North Carolina General Assembly in the punitive damages statute the relation of the conduct and whether

there was likelihood of serious harm; the existence and frequency of such conduct in the past; whether they profited; their ability to pay punitive damages. All those things are elements of punitive damages. It can't come in for malice but it can come in for punitive damages. I'm not sure where they get with their motion.

THE COURT: I don't know where they get it either. They have posed a question to the Court about whether or this can be excluded as evidence of malice. And if you are presenting it as evidence of malice, it's excluded. If you're presenting it for some other purpose it might be admissible. You do raise a point -- and I don't want to get caught off on a tangent here, but you do raise a point as to whether as we often have with regard to punitive damages claims.

Is there some evidence that is admissible only with regard to punitives? If so, are we going to need to bifurcate the trial and wait for the jury to come back? And only if the jury comes back in favor of the plaintiff then move on to that evidence? This was the -- I'm surprised that it has taken us three and a half hours to get here to the point that that issue has come up for the first time, but at least it has as to this one issue.

Are there other issues like that to where we're going to have to bifurcate the trial?

MR. DEAN: Your Honor, I think this Reuber type evidence is the exact type of evidence because we have two types of malice -- and that's what's confusing -- the constitutional actual malice for defamation, and then there's malice. And then there's the factors for punitive damages. And what Reuber is addressing is what the constitutional law is to be presented as relevant on actual malice, and what the punitive damages statute presents are the factors that our legislature thinks are relevant to a punitive damages award.

So I do think we could bifurcate. And I don't think it would be procedurally that difficult. One, all this testimony is already "in the can," to borrow the court's expression from earlier. I assume that most of this would come in through direct examination of Mr. O'Keefe, and so we know we can figure out exactly how long that could take. It strikes me it's probably less than a few hours of additional evidence.

On the flip side, the 403 concerns about this type of evidence are, I think, substantial because we're not just talking about profit motive and insensitivity to Mrs. Teter. We're talking about what other types of reports have you done in the past? Have you misrepresented yourself to a North Carolinian in the past? Have you ever been investigated by a state

attorney general? All of this other type of evidence. We still have to talk about some of those may be relevant on punitive damages, but they're certainly not relevant on malice. And I think bifurcation is a reasonable, practical solution that really shouldn't materially lengthen this trial because the testimony is already in the can.

THE COURT: Mr. Sasser.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, some of those issues are relevant to their recklessness; whether they have a business model of reckless disregard for the truth. I have not seen a motion to bifurcate yet. And I think as it now stands if those things are relevant for any purpose then they should come in in our case in chief.

THE COURT: Well I'm asking you the question as to whether there is evidence that you are proposing to elicit that is of any substantial quantum that goes only to the questions related to punitives. Because if there is then we have to bifurcate this trial. I don't care whether there's been a motion or not. I'm not going to allow you to pollute the jury with evidence that is not relevant until they have reached a verdict in your favor. That -- I mean that's normal. That's every case when you have that sort of thing coming up. So my point is, are we only talking about did you make a profit to this one

30-second blip of information? It sounds to me like you're saying there's a whole lot more than that.

MR. SASSER: There's more than that. Did you come to North Carolina and lie to elections officials repeatedly? Did you lie to the Secretary of State about whether your CEO is a convicted criminal? Those sorts of things. There's not that long of a period of time, but there's several different elements.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I think you've told me then that we probably need to bifurcate this trial, and we -- any evidence that is relevant only to the questions of punitives, including the availability of punitives -- in other words, the other type of malice will go after a verdict if there's a verdict for the plaintiff.

MR. SASSER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: These last two pertain to the plaintiff's other projects and other investigations.

Mr. Sasser, is that what you were referring to with regard to some of this other evidence on punitives?

MR. SASSER: That's correct. And also to prove reckless recklessness and that they -- that they have a business model of coming out and doing the same thing over and over. That they -- it makes it more likely they were reckless if they had done this in the past.

THE COURT: How does that come within 404(b),

prior bad acts? They were bad before so therefore they 1 must be bad again? It says it doesn't come in unless you 3 can use it to prove some other element. 4 MR. SASSER: As Your Honor knows from criminal cases there's always some other element. 5 6 THE COURT: Yeah, but you've got to be able to 7 articulate what it is. 8 MR. SASSER: Motive, intent, plan, modus 9 operandi. They've said what their modus operandi was. Mr. O'Keefe asked him if he did usually use hidden 10 cameras, and he goes yeah that's our modus operandi. 11 what they do their recklessness here is -- and lack of 12 13 accident --14 THE COURT: What are you proposing to ask them? 15 In other words, are you planning to ask the defendant, or 16 somebody on behalf of the defendant, you know, isn't it 17 true that you've used hidden cameras in projects before? 18 MR. SASSER: More than that, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Well how much more than that? I asked Mr. O'Keefe -- and this is 20 SASSER: MR. 21 in the first ten minutes of his deposition. If you look 22 at the few first few pages of the transcript: Did you come to North Carolina and lie to elections officials? 23 24 Not really. Okay. Is this you in a video saying your 25 name is somebody other than "James O'Keefe" to an

official at a polling place? Well, yeah, that's me. And did you do this? And did you tell people -- did you tell the world that two people from North Carolina were lying about being United States citizens when they were not?

He's just, yeah, trying to -- he had to apologize for that. He did that too. Those kind of things.

And the stuff about the Secretary of State is very short. We haven't gotten into the issue about his criminal conviction. But those are the kind of things -- and I think the criminal conviction goes to his credibility. And there is -- I don't think there's a motion in limine on that.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, that -- that's something very different from what I understood to be the motion in limine. Obviously, where you're directly attacking the credibility of a defendant with regard to specific acts -- I mean that's Rule 609. How are you coming within Rule 609?

THE COURT: Particularly the way that you were just describing how you apparently did it in the deposition. I don't know how you're going to do it at trial, but extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But the Court may, on cross-examination,

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allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of
 1
   the character, et cetera.
               SASSER: It was cross-examination, Your
 3
          MR.
 4
   Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. But I thought you were talking
 5
    about playing a video to bring in extrinsic evidence.
 6
 7
                SASSER: The video of his deposition.
 8
          THE COURT: Okay. That's not what I thought you
 9
   were saying.
10
          MR.
                SASSER:
                         I'm sorry. There was another thing,
         You're not confused. I was also talking about a
11
   video of him accusing North Carolina citizens of being
12
13
   not United States citizens inaccurately. That does sound
14
   like a prior act.
15
          THE COURT: Well.
16
                         I need to look at that.
                SASSER:
17
          THE COURT: I think even though it's not an issue,
18
   with regard to these motions in limine on the issue that
19
   you have raised, I think the majority of the answers to
20
   your questions are in Rule 609 or in 404(b).
21
                SASSER:
                         There may well be -- those issues
22
   may well be in the deposition designations for,
   unfortunately, Your Honor's consideration.
23
2.4
          THE COURT: Okay. I thought we were talking about
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Is Mr. O'Keefe not going to be present for

25

Mr. O'Keefe.

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the trial?
 1
               SASSER: I don't know. I was planning to use
          MR.
   his deposition as a statement of a party.
 3
 4
          THE COURT: Okay. So using a party deposition
   under Rule 32?
 5
 6
          MR.
               SASSER: Yes, sir.
 7
          THE COURT:
                      Okay.
 8
          MR.
                      Your Honor, one question about that
               DEAN:
 9
   based on the exchange that just occurred. This is not
10
   cross-examination. These were Mr. Sasser's first
   questions in his deposition. So when we're looking at
11
12
   this from a Rule 609 perspective, we haven't treated any
13
   of this as cross-examination. If they're putting in
14
   Mr. O'Keefe as part of their examination, or as part of
15
   their case in chief, and that's their direct, is Your
16
   Honor saying that you believe it is cross-examination?
17
          THE COURT: I have no idea. I haven't read the
18
   deposition.
19
               DEAN: All right. I wanted to make sure --
20
   from that interaction I think the deposition speaks for
21
   itself on that point.
22
          THE COURT: Okay. All I was going on is
   Mr. Sasser said it was on cross-examination. I took that
23
24
   at face value.
25
               SASSER: Your Honor, that's what I meant by
          MR.
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questions I asked him in his deposition. I was referring
 1
   to that as cross-examination. I was not offering
   extrinsic evidence of any of those things. For example,
 3
 4
   the criminal conviction. I asked him about it, and he
   answered I'm not trying to bring anything in to show that
 5
   that happened since he admitted it.
 6
 7
          THE COURT: But here is where I'm confused.
        Dean, if I'm understanding him correctly, is saying
 8
 9
   this wasn't cross-examination. This is right at the
10
   beginning of your direct examination of Mr. O'Keefe when
11
   you noticed up his deposition and took his deposition,
12
   apparently for the purposes of preserving it for trial,
13
   at least as a Rule 32 deposition. Is that
14
   cross-examination under 609?
15
               SASSER: I think it is, Your Honor.
          MR.
16
          THE COURT: Because you pulled that out of your
17
   ear, or you have a case that says that?
18
          MR.
               SASSER: Because I'm not offering extrinsic
19
   evidence. It's questioning the witness. It's not
20
   questioning somebody that --
21
          THE COURT:
                       There's a non sequitur there.
22
   saying it's not cross-examination because you're not
   offering extrinsic evidence.
2.3
2.4
               SASSER:
                         I'm sorry. It is cross-examination
25
   under Rule 609 because I'm not offering extrinsic
```

1 evidence. THE COURT: Extrinsic evidence is not admissible. 3 MR. SASSER: Yes, sir. 4 THE COURT: To challenge -- let me just read you the rule, because you -- I think you've taken the rule 5 and turned it on its head. Extrinsic evidence is not 6 7 admissible to prove specific incidents of a witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's 8 9 character for truthfulness. Period. But the court may, 10 on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if 11 they are probative of the character for truthfulness, et 12 cetera. 13 So you can do it without extrinsic evidence on 14 cross-examination. So was this on cross-examination? 15 Because if it's not on cross-examination you can't do it. SASSER: Your Honor, I consider it 16 MR. 17 cross-examination when I'm deposing somebody on the other 18 side not questioning my own witness. That's my 19 understanding of what cross-examination means. 20 THE COURT: Well you might want to find a case 21 that interprets Rule 609 that way because I don't know 22 what the answer is. But it's an interesting question. 2.3 MR. SASSER: 608, Your Honor. Is it 608 or 609? 24 THE COURT: 609 is what I'm talking about. 25 DEAN: Your Honor, I think 611 is the mode MR.

and operation of testimony. Then it talks about the scope of cross-examination should not go on beyond subject matter direct examination. I mean I don't know a person in the country -- a lawyer who says that you can cross someone who hasn't been directed. And if that's the case then you could call an adverse party and just lead them all the way through your case in chief and go on home.

I mean Mr. Sasser asked the first questions and, in terms of the deposition, I was the one doing the cross examining. But Mr. Sasser asked these questions right out of the gate in his deposition of Mr. O'Keefe. That was the direct examination. He wasn't crossing anything because he wasn't asking Mr. O'Keefe about direct examination testimony that Mr. O'Keefe had given.

THE COURT: Yeah. If you-all have some case law on the interpretation of 609 on this point I'd be glad to read it, but -- and you know you can call an adverse witness, but that's not what we're talking about here. Because as far as I know Mr. O'Keefe is a defendant and he's going to be here.

We're talking about the use of this deposition as a Rule 32 deposition. Therefore, you know, you look at the face of the deposition. What is direct examination? What is cross-examination? And if this is right in the

first five minutes of that deposition I have trouble seeing it as cross-examination. Now if Mr. O'Keefe shows up and he testifies, or if you call him as an adverse witness, it might be a different matter.

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, I'll read the rest of Rule 611(b) that Mr. Dean just mentioned. Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination, a matter affecting the witness's credibility. So that's -- I was going to his credibility on that. But I will research that rule and we may, if it's permissible, have the parties submit some -- at least a case that will give you some guidance with regard to the deposition designations.

THE COURT: Please go ahead and submit anything like that. Please don't make it lengthy. Just simply giving a citation to a case or a paragraph quote from a case with the citation so that we can look it up, and I'll read that. I have to say that -- I generally feel like I know the Rules of Evidence, but that's an issue that I don't remember ever coming up. Maybe it should have before.

I've come to the end of my notes on the motions in limine. Is there anything else that we need to talk about?

MR. SASSER: Your Honor, is there a filing due on

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Friday of next week, like the exhibits, perhaps? I was
 1
    trying to --
          THE COURT: By the middle of the day on the Friday
 3
 4
   before jury selection you have to file your witness
    lists. And I don't remember exactly what your case
 5
   management order says, but I want you to file your
 6
 7
   exhibit lists as well.
 8
          MR.
               SASSER: So we can do that electronically.
 9
   There's not going to be anybody, I understand, in the
    clerk's office, but we can do that electronically.
10
11
          THE COURT: Right. You should be able to file
12
    that in the ECF system. That shouldn't be a problem.
13
          MR.
                SASSER: And there may be things that could
   not be filed electronically, such as a video or something
14
15
    like that, and we would FedEx it and the clerk will get
16
    it Monday morning I assume.
17
          THE COURT: Well like what? Tell me what you have
18
    in mind here because we're going to have to work around
19
    this.
20
                         I have nothing in mind, Your Honor.
          MR.
               SASSER:
21
    There have been situations in the case where we've had to
22
    file things that could not be filed electronically.
2.3
          THE COURT: Yeah. I can't think of any last
   minute filings of that nature --
24
25
          MR.
               SASSER: All right.
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THE COURT: -- that you would have right before a trial. Because it's not like a summary judgment motion or opposition to a summary judgment or something like that where you have video exhibits and all these things that are nonreproducible. The main things you're doing at the last minute are going to be documentary in nature. It's going to be witness lists, it's going to be exhibit lists; it might be some additional exhibits sometimes. Please don't drop another 1,700 pages of depositions on me.

Okay. Any other issues or any other things that we need to address? Anything that we can do today that will save us time on May the 20th?

MR. SASSER: Do you want us to continue to try to modify deposition designations, taking into advice what we've heard about motions in limine, and try to get you something some time next week?

would hope -- even though I haven't had a chance to look at your designations yet I would hope that the discussions that we've had on the motions in limine will be limiting your objections as well as your designations considerably. I have to admit, ordinarily for a trial the designations and objections for depositions to be used at trial is something that I can dispose of in half

1 an hour. It usually is not very involved at all. It's a 2 handful of questions.

I was utterly stunned when I got 1,700 pages of transcript along with page after page after page of designations and objections. It just -- my initial reaction was come on guys read the rules of evidence.

But, you know, maybe it's more complex than that. Don't take that as a criticism. That was just my initial reaction.

My law clerk is reminding me of sort of a logistical problem that we have with regard to the 1,700 pages that you have submitted. You've submitted them only in electronic format which presents a real problem for me because I need it on paper. And I would need -- in fact, if you could do it before you leave town. Do it this afternoon. Get us those 1,700 pages with the designations, with the objections highlighted the way you have done electronically. Get them to us in hard copy this afternoon and that would be a tremendous help. And then if you can limit it further next week that would be great, but at least that sure helps.

MR. SASSER: Does Your Honor mind front and back copy? Because I've got it right there.

THE COURT: That's fine. So long as it's on paper. Are these on the condensed transcripts like the

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1
    little bitty pages?
 2
          MS.
               RINI: Two on one page.
 3
          MR.
               SASSER: Quasi-condensed.
 4
           THE COURT: Yeah.
                              That's better than what I have
               I'll get out my magnifying glass. Thank you.
 5
    right now.
               MONTECALVO: Your Honor, can I take a shot at
 6
          MR.
 7
    limiting it a little bit further?
 8
           THE COURT: Say again.
 9
          MR.
               MONTECALVO: Can I take a shot at limiting
   the designations a little bit further?
10
                       If it's going to save us time or help
11
           THE COURT:
12
   us, I'm very open to that.
13
          MR.
               MONTECALVO: We had a general objection on
14
    the use of one of the transcripts in its entirety, and
15
    that's the transcript of Ms. Comerford from November
16
          We took Ms. Comerford's deposition in 2018 within
17
    the discovery period. And then last month -- last month
18
   we took the de bene esse deposition of Ms. Comerford in a
19
   much more condensed format that ended up being two hours.
20
          By stipulation, we got an hour and the plaintiff
21
   got an hour. We designated on that second transcript,
22
    and we were surprised to get a designation on the first
   transcript from the plaintiff which caused us, then, to
23
   counter designate on the first transcript as well.
24
25
   don't -- under Rule 32, we think that only the second
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1
    transcript should be the one that is presented into trial
   because it was the de bene esse deposition transcript.
           THE COURT: Well I'm not understanding where
 3
 4
   you're getting that out of Rule 32. What provision are
   you relying on?
 5
                MONTECALVO: Well she actually was available
 6
          MR.
 7
   at the trial through that deposition that we took last
   month.
           And because we asked the questions and primarily
 8
 9
   very similar questions than what when he we had asked at
10
    the longer deposition in November, based on the
11
   unavailability -- based on the availability of her that
12
   we were presenting her through that deposition
13
    transcript, it didn't seem appropriate to go back to an
14
    earlier transcript and also designate that.
15
           So what the jury is going to end up getting are
    two transcripts from Ms. Comerford that deal with,
16
17
   primarily, the same subject matter. I can't point to a
18
    specific portion in the rule that relates to this
19
    specific instance.
20
           THE COURT: Is the de bene esse deposition done on
   video?
21
22
                MONTECALVO:
                             It was.
          MR.
          THE COURT: Was the earlier one done within on
2.3
24
   video?
25
           MR.
                MONTECALVO:
                             It was not.
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THE COURT: Okay. Well what we'll have here, if I understand what is being proposed, is there will be a video deposition of Ms. Comerford played for the jury that includes direct and cross-examination, and that will be followed by a short addendum to that where you do it the old-fashioned way and somebody sits in the chair and asks the questions and somebody sits in the witness stand and reads the answers from the earlier deposition.

MR. MONTECALVO: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean if there's something in particular that you want to point to in Rule 32 that says once you take a de bene esse deposition the older deposition no longer counts it's no longer within the rule I'll look at it, but I've never heard that before.

MR. MONTECALVO: Well I don't think we've -- I've seen that situation come up. At the very least, it seems like it would be cumulative under 403 to have a lot of the same questions.

THE COURT: Cumulative evidence is still not admissible. So, in other words, if it is the videotape that has Ms. Comerford saying A, B and C, and then reading from the witness stand Ms. Comerford again saying A and B, that will probably be excluded. It's got to be new information. To state the obvious: When you have depositions read to the jury from the witness stand the

```
old-fashioned way, jurors hate that because they don't
 1
   see the witness. They don't have the opportunity to
 3
   determine the credibility of the witness. You put them
 4
   to sleep. All of the earmarks of poor presentation are
   in that kind of a deposition. So unless you have more
 5
   than just a few lines from it it's not prohibitive but it
 6
 7
   sure is a bad idea.
 8
          MR.
               SASSER: Your Honor, with regard to one other
 9
   deposition. We would like you to completely disregard
   the one of Ruth Smith. We designated it because she was
10
   a party opponent at one point. We're withdrawing that,
11
12
   so you do not need to go through anything involving that.
13
          THE COURT: Okay. You say she was a party
14
   opponent. She was --
15
               SASSER: She was deposed. She was
          MR.
   representing her father Mr. Campbell.
16
17
          THE COURT: Okay. She wasn't a party opponent,
18
   was she?
19
               SASSER: No, sir, she was a representative
   for him.
20
21
          THE COURT:
                      Okay. Anything else? Anything that
22
   might save us some time or that will streamline things if
   we address it now?
2.3
24
          MR.
               SASSER: Any predictions on the ruling on the
25
   per se/per quod issue? Timing on that?
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1
          THE COURT: As soon as I can get to it.
 2
                SASSER: All right. That sounds great.
 3
          THE COURT:
                       The more you load me up with
 4
   deposition designations the longer it will take.
                         Will it help if we were to limit it
 5
          MR.
                SASSER:
 6
    to the depositions transcripts we were using for the case
 7
    in chief rather than punitives? We've already designated
    it both ways, and I'm sure Your Honor can flip through
 8
 9
   and tell what's punitive and what's not.
10
          THE COURT: Well I tell you what would be helpful
11
    for updating your designations and objections one
   deposition at a time rather than waiting until you have
12
13
    all of it done and unload it on us at one time. When you
   have one of them done, provide that information, you
14
15
   know, by filing it. But also email it to Ms. Ritter so
16
    that we can take that up and take a look at that.
17
                SASSER: Yes, sir, we will do that.
          MR.
18
          THE COURT: I fear we are going to be spending our
19
   weekend on that.
20
          MR.
                SASSER:
                         I'm sorry.
21
          THE COURT:
                       Even if you're sending it to us on a
22
    Saturday afternoon that will probably be helpful.
2.3
          MR.
                SASSER:
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?
24
25
          MR.
               DEAN:
                       Judge? I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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1
          THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Dean.
 2
               DEAN: Mr. Montecalvo and I didn't hear the
          MR.
 3
    same thing. You want us to submit depositions as they
 4
   are done in their entirety. So Mr. O'Keefe's
   designations from their side, our counter designations
 5
    and objections, their counter counter designations, and
 6
 7
    then submit that one deposition. Is that what you said,
   Your Honor, you'd like us to do?
 8
 9
          THE COURT: It would be helpful for you to do
10
    that. And do that one after another as opposed to
   waiting until you have all of them finished and then
11
12
   unloading all of them on us on, say, Wednesday of next
13
   week.
          I'd rather get one this afternoon, one tomorrow
14
   afternoon, one Sunday afternoon, and three on Monday,
15
    than to get all of them on Wednesday.
16
               DEAN: Understood. Thank you.
          MR.
17
   clarifies it. Thank you.
18
          THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? All right.
19
   Well I appreciate all your hard work and all your
20
   preparation in this, and I'm sure you're looking forward
21
    to everything you're going to be doing for the next three
22
   weeks which will be this case and nothing else.
2.3
          With that, marshal, please recess us until further
   call.
24
25
                     (Off the record at 1:00 p.m.)
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**CERTIFICATE** I, Tracy Rae Dunlap, RMR, CRR, an Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, do hereby certify that I transcribed, by machine shorthand, the proceedings had in the case of SHIRLEY TETER versus PROJECT VERITAS ACTION FUND, et al, Civil Action Number 1:17-CV-256, on May 3, 2019. In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my name, this 7th day of May 2019. \_\_/S/\_\_Tracy Rae Dunlap\_\_ TRACY RAE DUNLAP, RMR, CRR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER